Floundering towards Eurocommunism
While Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire theorists flounder towards Eurocommunism, the SWP's Alex Callinicos can only answer them with evasion. In the first of two articles, Mike Macnair discusses revolutionary strategy
A strange thing happened on January
28. Socialist Worker published a report of the 16th
Congress of the French Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR, but more
commonly abbreviated to 'the Ligue'). The report, by Alex Callinicos,
offers an account of the views of the different platforms in the Ligue
debating where it should go in the next year, and reports the percentage
votes some of them obtained and the fact that Platform 1, the outgoing
leadership majority, won just less than 50% of the total votes cast.
It is a strange thing to happen because Socialist Worker has a
long history of pretending to be the far left's Daily Mirror, a
paper which addresses the broad masses. SWPers would say that these masses
are not interested in the internal affairs of far left organisations.
In reality, of course, Socialist Worker's paid sales are not much
above the SWP's claimed membership: the paper's Mirror style leads
it to preach low-grade banalities to the converted. In this context, for
Socialist Worker to publish Callinicos's report of the Ligue congress
is surprising. It is also - if it proves to be the beginning of a trend
- a major step forward.
The account is, quite properly, from a slant given by the Socialist Workers
Party leadership's current political views. Perhaps less satisfactorily,
it is only partially informative. It offers a substantial critique of
Platform 1, and a brief account of the view of Platform 4, which includes
the SWP's co-thinkers. The other platforms only get side swipes which
do not really tell us much about their views: Platform 3 "see the LCR
as a catalyst in a realignment of the left involving elements of both
the CP and SP, and some at least don't rule out LCR participation in another
'plural left' government," and Platform 2 brought out the "sectarian logic"
of Platform 1's arguments (by being sectarians).
The Ligue's own report in the Fourth International's International
Viewpoint webzine (www.interna- tionalviewpoint.org) tells us only
that minorities existed, not what they said, and is even more opaque (it
should be said that the documents of the several platforms are available
in French on the Ligue's website: www.Ligue-rouge.org/rubriquecongres.php-
The SWP has added to our knowledge of debates in the Ligue in another
way too. The January 2006 issue of the International Socialist Tendency
Discussion Bulletin (IST DB) put out by the SWP's 'international'
includes translations of three pieces on the question of revolutionary
strategy from the Ligue's theoretical journal Critique Communiste
and a comment on them by Callinicos (www.istend-
The immediate issue
The immediate issue is simple: should the Ligue participate, without
preconditions, in discussions whose aim is to try to achieve a unitary
candidacy of 'the left' in the presidential elections in 2007?
The context is that in the 2002 elections, there was no unitary 'left'
candidate. In the first round the Socialist Party candidate, Lionel Jospin,
did badly; and the Communist Party (PCF) candidate, Robert Hue, was out-polled
by both the candidates of the far left - Olivier Besancenot of the Ligue
and Arlette Laguiller of Lutte Ouvrière. Under the French constitution,
the effect of the divided left vote, and, more especially, the poor performance
of the SP and PCF, was that Jean-Marie Le Pen of the far right Front National
went through to the second round. The bulk of the left wound up voting
for the centre-right candidate, Jacques Chirac, in order to 'keep Le Pen
There are three problems with the idea that the Ligue should participate
in such a project. Two of these are matters of assessment of the political
situation - the character of the 'Plural Left' governments which preceded
Chirac, as influencing the 2002 defeat, and the European question. The
third is a strategic matter and by no means unique to the Ligue: under
what conditions should communists participate in coalition governments
formed on the basis of the electoral institutions of the existing capitalist
state (in France, the 5th Republic)? Equally, when should they support
or participate in electoral coalitions which are aimed to create such
The 'Plural Left' governments were in substance not dissimilar to Blairism
with a bit more left rhetoric. They accepted the general framework of
'national competitiveness', and launched a series of attacks on the rights
and interests of the French working class. The poor electoral performance
of the SP and CP in 2002 reflected the fact that the policy of their government
was discredited among a large portion of working class voters. It is unlikely
that enough time has passed for this to be forgotten, and if a 'united
left' candidacy offers a warmed-over version of the same policy in 2007,
it is likely to receive the same negative response as in 2002.
The European aspect consists in the victory of the 'no' camp in the May
2005 referendum in France on the EU constitutional treaty. Though a substantial
part of the 'no' vote came from the nationalist right, the result was
widely and rightly perceived as a rejection of the neoliberal character
of the treaty.
The SP was split down the middle on the referendum, and many leftists
held out the hope that the split would become permanent and the 'left
no' camp as a whole could be regrouped as a left force rejecting neoliberalism.
In the event the SP leaders decided at their November 2005 conference
to hang together rather than separately. Even the SP faction led by former
LCR oppositionist Gérard Filoche clings to the unity of the SP, as can
be seen in his comments on the Ligue congress (in the International
The opaque discussion in the Ligue takes the form of disagreement on
the interpretation of these two issues. Does the threat of the far right
override the political bankruptcy of the past 'social-liberal' governments?
How much political space, if any, is opened up by the 'no' victory
in May 2005?
However, judgments on these two questions are ultimately secondary. Such
judgments are inevitably formulated within strategic frameworks, even
if these are unspoken. The significance of the Critique Communiste
materials translated by the IST DB is that, if also in an opaque
way, they open up the question of strategic frameworks.
'Reformists' and 'revolutionaries'
The core strategic question is the meaning of the division between 'reformists'
and 'revolutionaries'. It is posed to the LCR because the Ligue has been
invited to participate in what is in substance a proposal for a coalition
to fight for a government which would pursue what have traditionally been
seen as 'reformist' objectives. It is posed to the Fourth International
more generally because for some time it has supported and participated
in the creation of parties and coalitions which, in Callinicos's phrase,
"leave open the question of reform and revolution", such as the Brazilian
Workers Party and, in Europe, Rifondazione Comunista, the Scottish Socialist
However, the experience of Brazil showed, and so in different ways do
the debates in Rifondazione and in the German proto-Linkspartei, there
are present-day choices facing the left about policy, government and coalitions.
And these choices still leave sharp differences.
On the one side are those who are willing, for the sake of lesser-evilism
or marginal advantages to the oppressed, to administer the existing capitalist
nation-state as part of the existing international state system without
fundamental changes. They are therefore prepared to form coalitions with
supporters of these systems, in which these supporters can veto policies
which are 'too leftwing'.
On the other side are those who insist that this policy is an illusion
which merely prepares the ground for disillusionment among the masses,
the advance of the far right, and new further-right centre-right governments.
From this perspective, making fundamental changes is the priority of any
socialist government, and perhaps such a government could only come to
power through a 'revolutionary rupture'. Only small and dispersed minorities
refuse any coalitions at all, but a significant minority would hold the
view that a coalition in which Blair, Schröder, Prodi or Fabius calls
the shots is not worth having and a stance of militant opposition - even
if it means militant opposition to a government of the right - is preferable.
This is the context in which the Critique Communiste documents
and Callinicos's response address the 'strategic questions'.
The first two documents translated are by Antoine Artous, the editor
of Critique Communiste. The first, titled 'The LCR and the left:
some strategic questions', is an 'I want to open the discussion' sort
of document. Artous tells us that the Ligue through the 1970s operated
on a dual axis of 'the united front' (seeking united action of the broad
movement, including unification of the French party-led trade union confederations)
and 'revolutionary unity'. The united front policy "ran into ... problems,
such as the issue of a 'workers' government'" and "developing a policy
on the governments formed by the communist parties and the social democrats".
The 'revolutionary unity' side is discreetly left undeveloped: the truth
is that the Ligue's efforts in this direction were pretty minimal.
Artous takes the opportunity to insist that the Ligue did not merely
take the Russian Revolution as a model, but "intended to revive the work
of elaboration carried out by the non-Stalinist Comintern [ie, the first
four congresses of the Comintern, 1919-22] and then by Trotsky and others
... by relating it to current experience (Chile, Portugal, etc)." But
"the Ligue still saw the most significant split in the workers' movement
... as being the split between 'reformists' and 'revolutionaries'".
This approach is obsolete, Artous argues, because "the current period
is characterised by the end of the historical cycle which began with October
1917". Hence, recycling Lenin's State and revolution (etc) is not
enough: "completely rethinking a strategy of social emancipation" is what
is called for.
Artous claims that the Ligue in the 1970s had, and has now lost, a "strategic
hypothesis": that of the "insurrectionary general strike". It is necessary
to reaffirm that there must be a "revolutionary rupture", but to admit
that this does not amount to a strategy. In place of this strategy, which
it shared, the SWP has put an ultra-minimum programme (Callinicos's An
anti-capitalist manifesto) coupled with abstract references to "the
revolution". This is an attempt to con the masses into making the revolution
(Artous' formulation is a little politer).
What is called for is a reforged transitional programme. Artous insists
that a full programme will require experiences of struggle, but suggests
two axes: (1) "the radicalisation of democracy, on the theme of democracy
in its purest form"; and (2) "the struggle against the commodification
of the world" - ie, to put it in less elevating terms, against privatisation
and cuts in welfare provisions.
He concludes that "it is not simply a case of rebuilding a workers' movement
... based on 'class foundations': this approach must dovetail with an
'alliance' policy which involves forming a social and political bloc with
the ... 'social movements'". The kind of new political force required
will have to (1) be anti-capitalist and socialist, and (2) "clearly differentiate
itself from social-liberalism". This latter point means that there can
be no practical unity between those who support and those who oppose creating
a government which includes the right wing of the SP.
There are three striking features of Artous' argument. The first is that,
although it purports to take into account the history of the Trotskyist
movement and of the Ligue in particular, it in fact merely recounts it
in order to set it on one side as not relevant to current conditions.
It is also not completely accurate. The Ligue's policy in the 1970s was
informed by the European perspectives of the 10th World Congress of the
Mandelite Fourth International. The characterisation of this policy as
expressing a strategy of "insurrectionary general strike" is a half-truth.
Its core was, in fact, the struggle to develop proto-soviet forms, both
in the course of the day to day class struggle and under revolutionary
conditions. It was argued that through the experience of proto-soviet
and soviet forms the proletarian masses could go beyond the SPs and CPs.
In the 1974-75 Portuguese revolution this policy failed disastrously to
provide any guide to action on the question of government. The Ligue has
thus been deprived of its strategy not because conditions have changed,
but because this strategy was proved by experiment to be wrong in the
conditions for which it was designed.
Rather similarly, Artous insists that the Ligue grounded itself on the
early Comintern: but he shows no sign of having actually read critically
the documents of the early Comintern or being willing to pass judgement
on what was right and what was wrong in these documents.
The second striking feature is that Artous is stuck with the Trotskyist
idea of a 'transitional programme'. He has a better idea of what such
a programme might be than some other users of it: ie, that it is to grow
out of existing objective conditions (not out of what is currently
popular, like the 35-hour week) and to point towards, in Artous' phrase,
"radical transformation of the system" (Trotsky, more bluntly and slightly
less economistically, said that it must point towards the conquest of
political power by the proletariat).
But here too Artous is unwilling actually to engage with the history.
The 1938 Transitional programme postulated that capitalism was
in its death agony and the immediate needs of the masses could only be
met by radical socialisation. It was this that made a 'transitional' programme,
as opposed to minimum and maximum programmes, appropriate. The 'transitional'
core in fact derived from the trade union programme of the Fourth Congress
of the Comintern, which was in turn based on German militant trade unionists'
responses to the conditions of acute economic disruption towards the end
of the 1914-18 war. In fact, the 'death agony' was that of the British
world hegemony, not of capitalism; and in 1939-45 the belligerents rapidly
introduced systems of planning and rationing which prevented the economic
chaos of 1914-18. The Transitional programme had no purchase on
False in its own time, the Transitional programme has provided
no guide to action for the Trotskyists ever since. Instead, they have
quite properly created minimum programmes - but usually called
them 'transitional'. Because the core of the 1938 programme was a trade
union programme, these minimum programmes have characteristically had
a strongly economistic cast. Artous has made an important step forward
in understanding that the struggle for "democracy in its purest form"
is critical to the proletariat as a class taking power. But he then fails
to develop this insight, focussing instead on the "struggle against commodification":
ie, (potentially) more economism.
Thirdly, when Artous discusses 'alliance policy', he misunderstands radically
what the proletariat is as a class in Marxist theory. That is, in Marxist
theory the proletariat is the whole class which is dependent on the wage
fund, not merely the employed workers. It is the proletariat's separation
from (ie, non-ownership of) the means of production which makes it
potentially the bearer of socialism/communism, not the employed workers'
connection to the means of production in the form of the workplaces.
In insisting that the 'social movements' are separate allies of the class
movement, Artous on the one hand ignores the roots of these movements
in processes of proletarianisation. On the other, he distorts the idea
of the workers' class movement into a misshapen, syndicalist-economist
form. The sort of workers' class political movement which the Second International
built was one which organised, through diverse and differentiated organisational
forms, on every issue and in every area of social life, including socialist
education, socialist credit unions, choirs, cycle clubs, and so on. Today
we need to fight to rebuild a class political movement in that sense,
not impoverished 'pure trade unionism'.
This error on the nature of class underlay the syndicalist character
of the Ligue's and Mandelites' (and the British SWP's) strategic perspectives
in the 1970s. It now has effects which threaten to amount to a repeat
of the 'alliance' ideas of the British Eurocommunists, who ended up destroying
their party. Those who will not learn from history - and Artous on the
evidence of this article will not - are condemned to repeat it.
Artous on Coutrot
The second piece by Artous is a critique of Thomas Coutrot's Democracy
against capitalism (Paris 2005), and Coutrot's intervention in Critique
Communiste in the debate on the Ligue's 2005 draft manifesto. Without
having read Coutrot's book, we have to read Artous' critique for what
it adds to our understanding of Artous' strategic conception.
Artous indicates at the outset his agreement with two of Coutrot's fundamental
views: (1) that after Stalinism and neoliberalism "only a project aimed
at the radicalisation of democracy could refound an alternative global
perspective"; and (2) "the task is to construct 'a historic social bloc'
(in the sense used by Gramsci) through the struggle against capitalist
Artous' disagreements with Coutrot are less clearly presented. It seems
that Artous thinks Coutrot believes that the struggle for democracy need
not confront the question of ownership of the means of production. In
Artous' view, on the contrary, the introduction of (eg) democratic workers'
control would in itself entrench upon, or at least radically change, the
right of ownership. This claim recurs throughout the piece and returns
in its conclusion.
Coutrot is also a fan of cooperatives and similar measures from below
of self-organisation of those excluded from the charmed circle of the
full-time permanent employees. It should be remembered that activities
of this sort were common to the pre-1914 socialist movement, including
the Bolsheviks. But both Coutrot (as reported by Artous), tentatively,
and Artous, more sharply, claim that there is no space for such initiatives
in the 'advanced capitalist' countries. No reason is given. In fact, the
abstention of the left from such initiatives has left the field to the
clergy and the charitable poverty lobby NGOs. It is hardly surprising
in this context that there is a significant revival of religion across
the 'advanced countries', if not yet as strong as in the US and the 'third
Coutrot is presented by Artous as hostile, in the name of democracy and
worker or worker-citizen control, to statisation of economic activities.
Artous insists, on the contrary, that in several areas statisation is
or may be necessary. What is truly extraordinary about this exchange is
a silence. Neither Coutrot (as reported by Artous) nor Artous has things
to say about democratising the state: freedom of information and
speech and an end to state and commercial secrets, workers' militia, trial
by jury and flattening of judicial hierarchies, abolition of hereditary
(monarchies) and elective (presidencies) systems of one-person rule, compulsory
rotation of officials, and so on.
The unavoidable conclusion: both Coutrot and Artous are beginning
to think about democracy; but neither has actually broken from the
deep-going economism of the organised left.
The third piece, by Cédric Durand, is adorned with flow diagrams (presumably
derived from a Powerpoint presentation ...) which add nothing. Durand's
argument is a more systematic and more extreme version of conclusions
which might be drawn from some of the points made by Artous.
Durand starts with a quite correct point. Since the beginning of the
'anti-globalisation movement' the current world order, together with the
states and elites which make it up, has suffered a considerable loss of
legitimacy. But this loss of legitimacy has not issued in a revival of
the organisations of the workers' movement and the left.
He notes that "the mistakes about governmental participation made by
members of the Fourth International in Brazil show how hard it is to take
a position when the question of governmental participation becomes explicit".
It is unclear whether this is intended as a criticism of the Democracia
Socialista majority who have remained in the Workers Party and the government
(the view after long hesitation taken by the Fourth International), or
of their opponents (which would imply that Durand accepts the idea of
participating in a 'social-liberal' government).
The point is nonetheless sound. Any political party which wins significant
voting support (and in political crises, even those which do not) is forced
to confront the question of governmental coalitions. This problem has
shipwrecked all the Trotskyist organisations which have approached having
a mass base (eg, the Sri Lankan Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Bolivian Partido
Obrero Revolucionario) and several other smaller ones.
It is now clear, Durand argues, that the failure of hostility to capitalism
to translate into support for the organised left (and the ascendancy of
anarchist ideas in the anti-globalisation movement itself) "are not merely
conjunctural developments, but are the product of profound scepticism
about the ability of political organisations to carry through the process
of social transformation". Put more simply, lots of people are fed up
with capitalism, but they do not trust the far left (or moderate left)
Durand restates the Ligue's old strategy of the "insurrectionary general
strike" or "strategy of dual power" slightly more accurately than Artous,
without commenting on it. He goes on to give an explanation of the failure
of this policy which, even more clearly than Artous' comments on alliances,
is grounded on Eurocommunist arguments initially developed by academics
around the 'official' CPGB.
In the first place, the communist and third-worldist strategies were
founded on an idea of the "homogeneity of the oppressed" which was "reductionist".
This in turn led to "substitutionism" in which spaces for self-organisation
were displaced by party hierarchy. The result is the seizure of power,
followed by "pragmatic" adaptation to the needs of state management: ie,
Stalinism. Secondly, there is "growing socio-economic complexity and fragmentation".
This has had the effect of undermining self-identification in terms of
class, as well as weakening the trade union movement. The "traditional
labour movement" thus tends to decline. Both arguments are stale Eurocommunist
crap familiar in this country from the 1980s writings of Eric Hobsbawm,
Stuart Hall, and so on.
Durand's strategic hypotheses to respond to this situation follow. He
argues that, instead of a strategy of 'preparing for' the insurrectionary
general strike, the process of social transformation should be extended
over a prolonged period of struggles. There should be "an immediate policy
consistent with its purposes", which implies the construction in present
struggles of forms of self-management, etc; but also that simple demands
for increased purchasing power are not enough. Struggle should be seen
as a form of emancipation in itself. There should be a "strategic commitment
free of any ambiguity to non-violence".
Secondly, strategy should move "from the decisive battle to the multiplicity
of strategic spaces". Following management theorist Alfred Hirschman's
1970 models of responses to the decline of firms, Durand proposes three
sorts of "strategic spaces": "exit", which means cooperatives, etc, in
"zones abandoned by capitalism" (?); "voice", which means strikes, protests
and NGO lobbying; and "loyalty", which is expressed in a commitment to
play by the rules of the political game. "The electoral field," says Durand,
"is indeed the legitimate arena to define the orientation of the political
Eurocommunist reasonings thus lead to Eurocommunist conclusions. French
comrades should be willing to look across the Channel for once (I know
it is never something that comes easy to them) and see what has become
of the ex-CP 'Democratic Left' built on this strategic orientation.
Callinicos's commentary on the French documents offers us three elements.
The first is an assessment of the international political situation. Here
Callinicos claims that there is a process of radicalisation, and the far
left are significant players in it, but that for it to develop into more
the masses have to move. This assessment allows him to evade the
fundamental point made by all the LCR authors: namely that the evolution
of the political situation since the later 1990s has shown that the radicalisation
against global neoliberalism has not reflected itself positively in growth
of the workers' movement and the organised ('reformist' and 'revolutionary')
left. On the contrary, Callinicos points to instances of relative growth
of far left votes which he himself explains in terms of the crisis of
the social democracy. The organised left has continued to decline, but
trade unions and the traditional mass workers' parties have declined faster
than the far left, leaving the far left relatively stronger. The 2002
votes in the French presidential elections are a clear example.
The second element is a critique, primarily of Durand, on the basis that
the policy proposed is warmed over Eurocommunism - as I have indicated
in my own comments on Durand (though Callinicos is a little more diplomatic).
In this context, Callinicos insists that at the end of the day the capitalist
state will resist socialist transformation using force, and that socialists
have to be prepared for - at some point - a forcible confrontation with
this state with a view to breaking it up and creating a new political
It is certainly true that there can be no socialism unless the capitalist
state's monopoly of organised armed force is destroyed. It is likely
that this would at some stage involve a forcible confrontation. However,
if the political crisis is deep enough, it is by no means impossible that
the ranks of the military would dissolve or go over in their majority
to the revolution. This certainly happened in 1917 and more recently in
Cuba and Nicaragua, and came close to happening in the French événements
of 1968 and in Portugal. In this case the capitalist class and the state
core would have grave difficulties in reconstructing an internal
military force to coerce the working class back into obedience.
Conversely, the question as to whether the workers' movement could win
a forcible confrontation is quite plainly to be answered, not by militarisation
of the organisational structure of the proletarian movement in advance,
but by the ability to improvise armed forces on the basis of broad mass
support once it became obvious that a forcible confrontation was inevitable.
This is one of the real lessons of 1917, and it is, in fact, inconsistent
with the conclusions the Comintern drew in 1921 about the 'epoch of wars
and revolutions' requiring the Communist Party to have a military character.
Callinicos simply fails to address these questions, just as he evades
the problem of broad mistrust of the far left.
Callinicos insists that the problem of the 'revolutionary subject' is
not new and consists, in substance, of members of the working class not
identifying themselves as workers. A correct and very helpful point follows:
"It has always required a complex process of struggle, organisation and
political intervention for a particular working class to start to imagine
itself as more than an aggregation of wage labourers, as a political subject
with a common identity and interests."
But then, of course, the question is: what sort of organisation and political
intervention could begin to re-establish class political consciousness?
Callinicos defends his 10-point programme from An anti-capitalist
manifesto, and argues that Artous' criticisms of it as minimalist
are either a discourse of Ligue members distancing themselves from the
SWP, or reflect the Trotskyist view that "the programme has a kind of
magical quality inherent in its demands connecting present struggles with
the overthrow of capitalism". This is a legitimate critique of Artous.
It is no answer to the objection - not made by Artous - that Callinicos's
10-point programme is wholly economistic, containing nothing other than
'defence of civil liberties' on the struggle for democracy.
Finally, he returns to his starting point: in various European left electoral
formations 'revolutionary Marxists' can play a pivotal role. The Ligue's
approach to the question of regroupment in the wake of the 'no' campaign
is a "passive, almost quietistic attitude that treats the outcome of struggles
as settled before they have begun".
Artous, Coutrot (as reported by Artous) and Durand are asking genuine
strategic questions, even if their answers are in several ways misconceived.
Callinicos evades these questions. He does so first by a combination of
arguments about the political situation. These amount to the idea that
the traditional far-left strategy (to which the SWP still formally adheres)
is not disproved, but 'our time may yet come'. The second element of evasion
is his reassertion of the point that it is likely at the end of the day
that there will have to be a forcible confrontation with the capitalist
state ('reform or revolution').
Callinicos presents the choice between 'reform' and 'revolution' as a
choice about forcible confrontation with the capitalist state. But if
this issue was really the core of his strategic argument, a key
policy conclusion would follow: revolutionaries must fight for arming
the working class and disarming the capitalist class. In the concrete,
this means fighting (a) for the universal right to keep and bear arms
and against 'gun control'; (b) for universal military service and a popular
militia to replace the standing armed forces; and (c) for full democratic,
political and trade union rights in the existing armed forces. No such
policy makes its appearance even in the SWP's more 'revolutionary' output,
let alone in its electoral policy, either through the Socialist Alliance
or more recently through Respect.
What is left of policy conclusions resulting from 'revolution' is just
one - that identified by Durand as "substitutionism". It is the degutted
remnant in the SWP's ideas of the Comintern's 1921 'Resolution on the
organisation of the communist parties'. In this view, since a revolution
entails forcible confrontation, it requires a party "of the Bolshevik
type", defined as one which (a) has a top-down, militaristic structure
and (b) remains 'pure' by organisational separation from
the pro-capitalist right wing of the workers' movement, as opposed to
political confrontation with their ideas. This idea was already
false in 1921 and has had disastrous consequences ever since. This is
the underlying ideology which sanctifies the character of the SWP, as
a bureaucratic dictatorship over its own ranks, and as a sect which poisons
everything it touches with control-freakery.
Callinicos's evasions thus indicate in themselves that the French authors
are tackling real and profoundly important questions. To understand in
a more fundamental way what is wrong with both the strategic ideas of
the French authors and with Callinicos's, it will be necessary to look
back in a bit more depth at how the 'strategic question' has evolved.
This will enable us to return, with more solid backing for concrete political
judgments, to the question of coalition governments and coalitions which
seek to create governments.