Socialist Party split Merseyside's view - Part I
Wrong global analysis
The SP continues to fragment. Last year Scottish Militant Labour liquidated itself into the left nationalist Scottish Socialist Party. Then the Merseyside regional committee was suspended, all but wiping out the organisation that was once the jewel in the SP's crown. We reproduce this discussion document of the ex-SP Merseyside Socialists
This document has been collectively discussed and produced by comrades on Merseyside who have recently left or been suspended from the Socialist Party. It is primarily a 'critique' of many of the positions adopted politically over the last 10 years by the Socialist Party/Committee for a Workers International. It concentrates on a number of key areas, but there are many other issues omitted. For instance little is said in relation to the debates around the Scottish Socialist Party. Also there is no fully worked out critique in relation to democratic centralism.
These are important omissions, but the problem we confront is of deciding whether or not to write a document for discussion or write a book. This document, together with a separate one detailing our organisational involvement in the dock dispute (1995-98), runs to 30,000 words. We therefore hope that this particular document will serve as a useful point of discussion despite these shortcomings. Above all we are interested in stimulating a thorough discussion which examines some of the past positions and one which concentrates on the politics and not the organisational issues.
Furthermore there is little in this document which defines precisely where comrades on Merseyside stand on many of the issues which we are critical about in relation to the Socialist Party. This is mainly because they are being actively debated. However, we do hope to produce a second programmatic document and circulate this for discussion and debate.
Some comrades may find it distasteful to go over 'old' ground; others may see it as further evidence of Trotskyist infighting. It has to be confessed that we partially share these misgivings. However, to re-orientate in a difficult and complex period, the past has to be understood. Wherever possible, polemical language has been deliberately avoided: 'facts', processes and tendencies are concentrated upon. We say 'facts' because their interpretation will be very much contested. For this reason extensive quotations and sources are provided - not to give an academic quality, but in order for those who wish to do so to go back and check the original material. In the case of national committee meetings there are only tape recordings available, held by the SP, which can be used to check our version. Given the possibilities of new technologies, these could easily made available by placing the recordings on the SP's website.
Because this document is intended for discussion purposes the length becomes important. We do not wish to deter anyone from reading its content. On the other hand, a concise and brief explanation of events covering the last decade is very difficult. For example, there is not included in this document any details of the dockers' dispute (a separate document is available). Similarly with the organisational issues (frankly of a secondary nature). And there is not a fully worked out elaboration of Merseyside's views on many issues presented here - only passing comments. By placing it in the public arena we hope that fruitful discussion can take place between revolutionaries. In our opinion the discussions in the CWI are pertinent to the whole of the movement, and from this we will be able to clarify and formulate ideas, views and perspectives.
This document will look back over a decade of political work and analysis to show that the present crisis of the Socialist Party and the CWI is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the period since the collapse of Stalinism at the end of the 1980s. This is not to say that everything can be traced back to this one particular event, but it serves as a useful benchmark in trying to highlight some of the difficulties faced by the Marxist/Trotskyist left.
As the 1980s drew to a close, sections of the Militant were increasingly beginning to question the dogmatic interpretations offered by Ted Grant. This resulted in a split and formation of the Socialist Appeal. Unfortunately, as the 1990s unfolded, there has been a creeping crisis in the SP/CWI, leading to the contraction, dissolution, disaffiliation and expulsion of individuals and sections. Unlike most other Trotskyist groupings the CWI had a history unmarked by expulsions. The last three to four years has seen a reversal of this tradition. In retrospect, it is now clear that the split was not grounded in any fundamental political reappraisal of the period.
As Paul Storey from the South African section pointed out at the time of the split, "The tendency has probably made an incorrect basic appraisal of the period since 1974, relying too much on assumptions which have not been retested" (P Storey, 'Addendum on some points of theory', September 14 1991). Unfortunately Paul's analysis, especially the part describing the impact of computer technologies, was disregarded by the international secretariat (IS) of the CWI. His views were described as "unMarxist", and reflected his viewing this as an "unrevolutionary period" (L Walsh, 'Report from South Africa', May 1995) - precisely the view which the IS subsequently adopted in their arguments for a name change. During this debate in 1995, the argument was advanced that socialist consciousness had been undermined to such an extent that the first revivals of opposition would not even be on a distinctly anti-capitalist basis, but would constitute a movement against the "effects of the market" (Name change debate Members Bulletin No18, June 1996): in other words an "unrevolutionary period".
Yet incredibly it was also asserted that in such a period it would be possible to build a small mass revolutionary party. Such a contradiction is supposedly explained away by the pending world slump, driving millions of workers into "mass rebellion", shattering "the illusions in capitalism" and leading to a situation were "consciousness will rapidly catch up with reality" (L Walsh Socialism Today October 1998). There is one small problem in this analysis: the capitalist system, according to Lynn Walsh, has been in "depression" since 1974, yet consciousness has actually gone back, and slumps and deep depressions generally (but not always) have the effect of stunning consciousness and working class struggle.
Enmeshed in this contradiction (which is not of a dialectical character) is a further conundrum: "Whatever the depth and duration of the coming world slump, however, the world economy will sooner or later, given the political weakness of the forces opposed to capitalism, move into a new period of cyclical growth" (emphasis added, L Walsh Militant International Review September-October 1983). In other words we may be in for a period of working class struggle, but it will be an "unrevolutionary period", because consciousness will not develop sufficiently to create a revolutionary alternative and capitalism will be able to create a new cycle of growth. Some of these points will be examined in more detail later on. Suffice to note at this stage that a mechanical link is actually being made between capitalist crisis and leaps in consciousness (despite protests to the contrary). Furthermore why has consciousness gone back during a time of depression? If (and it is a big if) consciousness-raising has to go through a number of stages, how can the period be characterised as being revolutionary, especially if a new cycle of growth is inevitable? This schematic and pessimistic prognosis of the economy and class consciousness has led to a series of political zigzags, which will continue and intensify.
Before going any further we need to clarify some of the terminology because of the confusion of terms used in the material of the Socialist Party. 'Slump' properly refers to the trough phase of the relatively short-term economic cycle when there is an absolute fall in production and trade. 'Recessions' generally refer, in the Anglo-Saxon economies, to an absolute decline in production over three successive quarters. 'Depressions' define a prolonged economic conjuncture characterised by growing 'organic' or 'structural' problems, as opposed to cyclical problems, for capitalism. The 'great depression' from 1873 to 1895-96 led in fact to a growth in anti-capitalist and socialist consciousness and it led to the growth of US and German capitalism based on expanding markets and technological advance.
The fundamental underlying premise of the current SP analysis is based around the following: "Looking back, the current depression, defined as a period of stagnation and decline, must inevitably be dated back to 1973-74 ... moreover, the current depression may well be more protracted than previous depressions" ('Our programme and transitional demands' Members Bulletin No13 1995).
From this analysis there are a whole series of questions. For example, what effect do structural readjustments have? What are the effects of inflation or more importantly deflation? What impact does state intervention have in a 'market economy'? What impact are new technologies having and, most importantly, how is political economy (the class and social struggle) impacting? Instead of taking regard of such points, the 'depressionary' analysis, which really tells us very little, is taken as a sort of article of faith. Ignored is the historical experience about the great depression at the end of the 19th century, a time of imperial expansion, the building of trade unions, and socialist parties. Of course the subsequent revival led to imperialist rivalries and world war, but are we saying this is the likely perspective? Obviously there is a new balance of world relations, shaped by the existence of nuclear weapons, the collapse of Stalinism, and through this the prospect for a continued expansion of markets. So a new period of cyclical growth in the world economy is likely, considering depressions are followed by periods of growth.
The key question is the response of the working class, and here the issues of the economy and class struggle cannot be mechanically linked together. Unfortunately instead of looking to political economy the analysis has been reduced to primitive slumpism.
Over the decade of the 1980s Militant gained a reputation for being involved in mass working class movements. Much of this arose from a perceptive analysis of how these movements would unfold. On the other hand critics of the Militant, amongst many other things, pointed to our economistic, determinist interpretation of events. Whilst being a polemical exaggeration, it has to be said that the inability to deal effectively with the mistakes of the 1980s led in the 1990s precisely in this direction. Most pertinent in this respect was the 'prediction' that Emu would not happen in January 1999.
The effects of 1989 and the collapse of Stalinism - a decisive turning point in world history - have continued to reverberate throughout the 1990s, introducing new features into political life and disorientating the whole of the Marxist/Trotskyist movement. Those who deny this are simply disavowing reality. Combined with the collapse of Stalinism has been the international rightwing shift of social democracy and national communist parties, who in many cases have been transformed into capitalist parties. These developments are rooted in the economic and social changes associated with globalisation and the move away, at least in the advanced countries, from industrial to service/information-based economies.
"The political terrain upon which we operate has changed fundamentally. Other organisations completely incapable of adapting to the new situation have either sunk into obscurity or have been wracked by crisis" (emphasis added Marxist Bulletin No2, January 1991). Arising from this new situation, the Militant/Socialist Party has seen two increasingly divergent trends with different methods of approach and analysis evolving over the last decade. The roots of the disagreements between Merseyside and the national leadership in London are political - not organisational, as the executive committee has tried to present.
The accepted orthodoxies of contemporary Trotskyism were questioned in the 1940s by Ted Grant and others. Now, quite rightly, there is a new period of questioning. Unfortunately the present leadership are incapable of reassessing the nature of the period, instead preferring to declare their infallibility, and in the process have isolated themselves from the real class issues and battles. From the 1980s there has been a need to re-evaluate and discuss some of the basic analyses of Marxism.
In relation to Stalinism internationally in the 80s, comrades from Merseyside originally raised a number of points. Namibian independence and the possibility of a cold transition to majority rule in South Africa (both of these issues were raised at the world conference and congress 1988/89) were a couple of examples. The comrades on Merseyside were much more emphatic in relation to the re-establishment of capitalism in eastern Europe and Russia. In 1991, Andy Ford, for example, raised the effect of the restoration of capitalism and its repercussions for world capitalism.
Another comrade argued that, "Capitalism may be weak and unstable in the East [Germany], but it is now the dominant form of property relations ... Poland in that sense represents in a more concentrated way the likely course of future developments. A failure on the part of the workers' leadership will lead to the restoration of capitalism ... because of the weakness of the eastern European economies; they will clearly be very unstable, very much on the model of Latin America and parts of Asia. Elements of capitalism will develop, but will depend on the patronage of the state to ensure their success. Moreover, they will only develop due to the extreme exploitation of the working class. Does this mean, therefore, that as in Asia, Latin America and Africa, in the early stages military dictatorships will be the form of rule? In the short term - in the next three to five years - this is unlikely because of the abhorrence of Stalinist rule and the illusions now created in democracy ... Russia now seems set on a very similar course to eastern Europe in respect to the restoration of the market and capitalism ... it could not be ruled out that even in the different republics separate armies and even foreign ministers would be allowed" (Marxist Bulletin No2, January 1991).
Recognition of the process of capitalist counterrevolution was made by the national leadership later in the year, though hedged with warnings that the "process has not been completed and certainly not consolidated". Furthermore "new attempts to impose open military rule are inevitable" (Revolution and counterrevolution in the Soviet Union September 1991).
A major contribution of the CWI was on the 'bourgeoisification' of the international social democracy. In other words the workers' parties being transformed into capitalist parties. Unfortunately the consequences of this have been catastrophic, resulting in 'ourselves alone'. As Roger Silverman pointed out, "Rather than anticipating events we are reacting to them, improvising ideas on the wing, seeking panaceas ... under conditions of widespread disorientation, however, our tendency is not immune from the dangers of disproportion and self-delusion. It has become almost a rule for sectarian groups that once their membership drops below a certain point, they proclaim themselves 'parties' " (Members Bulletin special, February 1997).
Merseyside did not oppose the need for the name change, but rather questioned the approach of the work and the repercussions on relations with other left groups. Reflecting this criticism, Peter Taaffe told the Australian Democratic Socialist Party (DSP): "We had to say we were a party. We were called Militant Labour, but we were not called a party. When you are a significant force you are a party, whether you like it or not ... of course, there are different socialist formations in Britain so there has to be a certain amount of confusion ... my answer is that we stand for the genuine unity of all socialist forces" (Links journal of the DSP, No9, November 1997).
Such fine words ring hollow, considering the reaction to the events in Scotland, where "genuine unity of all socialist forces", achieved by Scottish Militant Labour together with the left, was immediately denounced as "liquidationism". What genuine left unity means is clear from the statement of the SP executive committee: "This new Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) has not been organised as a broad socialist party on united-front lines. Nor is it a clearly defined revolutionary Marxist organisation. There are many very good points in the programme of the SSP, but it is not a clear Marxist programme" ('The Scottish Socialist Party, a statement from the EC of the SP' The Socialist November 20 1998). How a new broad-based party, which comprises "genuine unity of all socialist forces", can adopt a revolutionary Marxist programme at the very beginning is a mystery.
In relation to the building of new socialist parties, perspectives and programme should go together, but unfortunately this is not the method adopted by the EC/IS. The result is a switching of positions. On the one hand it was argued: "It would be inappropriate in advanced industrial countries to advance the slogans of "workers' parties" (Members Bulletin No13, 1996). After the name change debate this position was dropped. Instead the position became: "It is more correct to demand new socialist parties." Then, correctly, because of the complication Scargill introduced by launching the SLP, and because of our name change to Socialist Party, the demand was switched to new mass workers' party. This confusion is compounded by the absence of any serious discussion on the programme, despite the momentous and historic changes post-1989. Promises were made to have discussions on a programme for Europe, and globalisation, and for the reasons outlined below this did not happen.
Militant predicted the "red 90s", and comrades on Merseyside initially agreed with this. This position flowed from the understanding of the crisis of world capitalism and the massive social struggles of the 1980s. At the beginning of the decade major disagreements over work in and around the Labour Party led to a split. Merseyside as an area was to the forefront of the subsequent battles, being involved with the Broad Left councillors, the Walton by-election in 1991, the general election campaign for Terry Fields, the standing of independent Militant Labour candidates and the dockers' dispute 1995-98. (For background on Walton see Marxist Bulletin No4, October 1991; 'Scotland: perspectives and tasks', 1991; 'Majority resolution on Walton and for the Scottish turn: against dogmatic methods in thought and action'.)
Politically Merseyside supported the national majority and enthusiastically implemented the turn to 'open work'. At the time there were great hopes that the organisation had moved into a new period with open and democratic structures; the organisation was be more public, with no reliance on one or two national leaders. For a period of three years important initiatives were launched around Youth Against Racism in Europe (YRE), the Public Sector Alliance, anti-VAT campaigns, justice campaigns, school students, the Criminal Justice Bill, Jobseekers Allowance, Campaign against Domestic Violence and later on Socialist Alliances. Much of the drive for this came from the regions, or from the sections of the international in the case of the YRE.
Why has much of this type of broad open work been abandoned? The answer lies in the political perspectives not being borne out. As a result, moves were made to centralise the apparatus and to groom a new younger generation and attempt to build internationally through left fusions. In the case of the last two measures the only criticism would be of the methods adopted.
In 1996-97 the leadership began to correct their views in relation to the impact of the collapse of Stalinism, especially on class-consciousness, and industrial struggle. This was not done in an open and honest way, but rather as a way of promoting an entirely new way of working. Instead of broad-based work ('united fronts') the organisation was gradually steered towards a policy of 'ourselves alone'.
World economic perspectives
Nationally, in 1993, the position argued by the EC was of a period of economic crisis, recession and slump: "An open trade war, a 'hot war', could precisely plunge world capitalism from a growth slowdown/recession into a slump ... The 1990s will be characterised by a reawakening of the European proletariat and ... present big opportunities for growth" (IEC resolution on world relations Members Bulletin August 1993). "Whilst it is necessary to recognise the importance of the consequences of the collapse of Stalinism and the continuation of the boom in the recent period, it would be incorrect to imagine that these processes alone will dominate events in the short to medium term. The situation has developed with the onset of recession and the first stages of important movements of the proletariat" (our emphasis, 'Traditional workers' parties and our tactics' ibid).
By 1995, there had been no generalised recession (not even the onset of one), so little was said about world economic processes, though incredibly dates were advanced for a recession: "The IS will probably [our emphasis] be preparing a detailed account of the main trends in world capitalism. Suffice to say here that the present economic phase is marked by a slowing down in the growth of the major capitalist powers ... world capitalism is not yet on the eve of a recession; it is more 'reclining' than declining. However, a new recession probably looms at the end of 1996 or 1997, coinciding with the expected general election in Britain, which would seal the fate of the Tory government" ('The political situation in Britain' Members Bulletin No12, 1995). Interestingly Socialist Appeal had, for a time at least, a more correct economic analysis, which forecast that the economic upturn would last until 1996-97 - after which, of course, would come the obligatory recession.
Nothing much had changed by 1997 for the EC. The seventh year of US growth was acknowledged, but recession was supposedly just around the corner: it could be deeper than the 1990s and it would provoke continental movements of the working class in Europe. Immediately after the general election the prediction became a little more categorical: "With a new downturn, particularly a sharp world recession which is probable within a year or so, Blair would be forced to launch a further round of savage cuts" ('1997 general election and perspectives for Marxism', para 118 - note how these mistaken perspectives also have an effect on misjudging the tactics of New Labour).
As the months/years have gone by the intensity of prediction and the depths of crisis have grown: "The world economy is slipping into a downturn with the strong possibility of a severe recession" (Socialism Today editorial, May 1997). "An economic slump may develop even before a major financial crash ... there is now a worldwide trend towards higher interest rates" (L Walsh The Socialist November 28 1997). "Every region of the world will be drawn into the maelstrom, a severe downturn let alone a slump" (Socialism Today editorial, November 1997). At the March 1998 national committee Peter Taaffe was at one and the same time denying that the leadership had said that a slump was just around the corner and predicting a downturn in the world economy within six to 12 months.
The EC analysis is a form of economic reductionism, translating reality into simplistic deterministic formulas, a substitute for critical Marxist thought. Abandonment of critical and independent thought, discussion and action, has led to a situation were the leadership relies more and more on party loyalty and organisational means. Facts and figures replace real analysis, becoming, like the bourgeois press, a disguise for 'objective' reporting. Instead of looking at dynamic trends and underlying tendencies, attention is diverted away to facts and more facts. Instead of looking at the class forces, the balance of those forces, the real state of consciousness and the possibilities for struggle, there are simply predictions of global slump.
In this next section it is intended to elaborate some of the responses and views of the Merseyside comrades on these issues.
Merseyside response
Capitalism is and continues to be a system of crisis. Even the 'left' writers in the press recognise this. During periods of growth, even anaemic growth, the pundits and scribes get carried away and predict success, remaining oblivious to this underlying fact. As each crisis unfolds, Marxists can show they have a better understanding of the system, but obviously economic analysis by itself is not enough - otherwise socialism would have triumphed long ago. Whether there is a period of renewed growth, recession or slump, the decisive issues will be to do with political economy. In other words the balance and clash of class forces, the social and political class consciousness and the intervention of revolutionary forces. Underpinning this is the nature of capitalist investment, the changing nature of social relations, new technologies, including the techniques of social and political manipulation and control. Not for nothing did Lenin spend a great deal of his time analysing the nature of imperialism, a higher stage of capitalism. And, as he pointed out, capitalism will always provoke crisis, even bring humanity toward barbarism, but if the working class does not change society then capitalism can always find a way out at their expense.
In October 1997, Merseyside questioned, at the NC, the perspectives of the leadership in relation to the world economy. Was the world economy on the brink of a slump, and was it not possible for the US cycle of growth to last for 10 years? This was dismissed out of hand. At the time of writing (17 months later, there is still no immediate sign of recession in the US economy), there are of course portents of a potential slowdown (which could be partially cut across by interest rate cuts).
The position of the Socialist Party EC in October 1997 was that the USA would raise interest rates and cause a world crash. Furthermore the stock exchange was about to crash - 1929-style. True, there have been a number of severe adjustments and it would be foolish, given the volatility of capital, to completely rule out a crash, but the predictions have not been borne out. It was also raised by Merseyside about the possibility of political interventions, of the institutions of capital being mobilised to underwrite countries in crisis. Again this was ruled out, supposedly because the leading powers did not have the resources of 1987. Germany and Japan were in no position to underwrite the world economy.
Reality is somewhat different. Over the last year we have seen the crisis expand outwards from Thailand, dragging down 40% of the world economy into recession. Yet in the sphere of the political economy, the capitalist class has mobilised the political, social and economic resources to nationalise debt, to allow recession to do the work of liberalisation, deregulation and imperialist penetration. Interest rates have risen or fallen depending on the circumstances, deals have been done to restructure debt and other financial instruments used to try and provide a way out. Additionally, the organisations of the IMF and World Bank have provided the necessary resources, accompanied of course by savage austerity measures. Now the talk is of a new Bretton Woods and a restructuring of the financial institutions. Even some form of capital controls may be implemented, particularly in the developing world, if the crisis threatens to engulf the whole system.
However, in all of this the key issues are class struggle - the effects of the austerity measures and the response of the workers and peasants - because at present the crisis is being placed on their shoulders. This is how capital proposes to solve its problems, and, though in the short term it may deepen the economic crisis, in the longer term this is how capital can secure the necessary surplus value to begin the cycle of production once again. Additionally an assessment of the political economy of the ruling class should be a key component of any analysis. The power interests of the two key blocs, America and Europe - and now to a lesser extent Japan and South East Asia - force them in the direction of taking decisions which are in their longer-term interests.
China may, at some stage, be forced to devalue, because of the turmoil in the world economy, but the longer-term interest of participating in the world capitalist market and being admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) currently postpones this. Likewise, the EC glibly repeat that protectionism is inevitable. Again there is no real definition of terms. Protectionism on a world scale leading to a repeat of 1930s slump is theoretically possible, but for now is unlikely, because it would mean an absolute disaster for the leading capitalist powers and particularly for the dominant multinationals. If the working class was politically crushed, if military or fascist dictatorships came to power, then there could on the basis of a worldwide crash be a return to protectionism, to years of no growth, of barbarism and war, but this is not an immediate perspective. The working class is still potentially strong: capitalism sees for the moment 'democracy' as the best method of rule. All this could change, given a severe economic crisis and a mighty challenge on the part of the working class. Swift developments may take place. The collapse of Stalinism, not foreseen by us, is one example of this, but even given swift changes we cannot fall back on simplistic formulations.
In any case a form of concealed protectionism already exists - the developed countries force it upon the rest of the world. America in particular plays the leading role. Nafta, Gatt, the MAI are all about protecting the interests of the multinationals and transnationals. There is no such thing as the 'market' economy: it is a charade perpetrated upon the working class and middle class. The capitalists are underpinned and supported by the state. The trade blocs of Nafta and the European Union are about protecting the interests of the multinationals in these areas of the world. The World Bank, IMF, Bank of International Settlements all act on behalf of these organisations. The reality is that world trade is dominated by multinationals and transnationals - their inter-firm trade is greater than the whole of world trade. Why then would they want to turn to protectionism? Moreover, the power of these organisations is the driving force behind globalisation and projects like European Monetary Union, Nafta and the MAI. If more attention was paid to the political processes of the forum which meets annually in Davos and subsequently direct much of national government policy, then the SP would not be in the mess it is in today.
Various governments could well be "forced to turn back to state intervention to prop up big business and banks" (Socialism Today December/January 1998). This is really stating the obvious and simply reflects the state being there to act as the lender of last resort to the capitalist system. Debt 'socialisation' - really 'nationalisation' - took place in Latin America, in the US with the savings and loan crisis, Mexico with the peso crisis in 1994, and now Japan. To say such measures "will not provide a way out for capitalism" (L Walsh 'World economy' Socialism Today October 1998) is not only crude: it is naive. The crisis can be placed on our heads.
Part I - Wrong global analysis
