Socialist Party split - Merseyside's view - Part III
Retreat into sectarianism
Merseyside Socialists, who recently left or were suspended from the Socialist Party in England and Wales, complete their critique of the leadership
Prior to the 1987 election Merseyside comrades raised at the national committee - in opposition to the then leadership - the possibility of the Tories winning the general election. Such a position was scoffed at by Ted Grant. In later years, however, the political perspectives of the leadership concerning Labour altered only marginally. In 1989 Merseyside wrote in regard to the draft perspectives document that it would be better "to emphasise the pusillanimity of the Labour leadership who could yet snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Of course a big swing to Labour cannot be ruled out, but the scale of the task to obtain a majority government is something which will be hard to achieve ... Labour are likely to win, but without an overall majority" (Letter to EC, 1989).
Verbally, in the years prior to the 1992 election, our warnings became more emphatic: a Labour victory was not assured. The national leadership in contrast, throughout the whole period from 1987 to 1997, was arguing for the likelihood of a Labour victory. After the 1992 general election defeat for Labour, caution became a necessity and a dual position was adopted: on the one hand it was "not at all certain that Labour will win" and on the other hand "the Tories will probably be swept from power" (Congress document, February 1994). It was the same in October 1995: "A Labour victory remains the most likely outcome ... but it is no means guaranteed" ... "It therefore cannot be excluded that the Tories could creep back in" (Members Bulletin No12, 1995).
In the name change debate (1996) Merseyside were not ruling out the possibility of a Labour victory, but argued: "The root of the problem seems to be insufficient attention to the whole question of perspectives for the Labour government, the SLP and the left as a whole. Insufficient attention is paid to the likely developments under Labour - the likelihood of formal or informal alliances with the Liberals, the possibilities of Europhiles splitting from the Tory Party and joining New Labour, the possibility of Blair introducing proportional representation (especially if he only has a small majority), the changing of Labour's name - all of these issues should be addressed."
It went on to say: "We need to maintain our own identity. We need to build our own organisation on revolutionary and democratic centralist lines, but we have never done this in isolation from the rest of the left ... We have recognised our organic link with the working class and its organisations ... the documents reiterate we have a dual task to build our own organisation and to work with Socialist Alliances. But the alliances are relegated to the future. If they were to the forefront of our work we could more closely see the potential difficulties in calling ourselves the Socialist Party. On the one hand we are the SP, but we are calling for the formation of a mass socialist party" (Merseyside Committee statement, name change debate Members Bulletin No19, September 1996).
For Merseyside this line of reasoning was for the building of genuine broad-based Socialist Alliances in which a Marxist programme could be argued for and advanced, in much the same way as Scottish Militant Labour, and the comrades in Ireland (North and South), subsequently implemented: "Linked to the work of Socialist Alliances is the need to work in the unions, to promote the ad hoc bodies, unofficial committees and broad lefts ... the dockers' dispute with its bringing together of the left and the moves to unite the broad lefts into a new national broad left show new structures are arising which could easily be linked to the project of Socialist Alliances" (ibid).
Forgetting these past positions and debates, the leadership then claimed they had broadly got it right in predicting a landslide victory, though the actual source for their claim is not given. A similar process of political amnesia is likely to follow in relation to prospects for Labour in power, which according to Peter Taaffe would have a "very short honeymoon period, if any at all" (Links journal of the Democratic Socialist Party of Australia, No9, November 1997).
Organisational results of the political crisis
The political crisis in the SP developed rapidly from 1995-96, the most immediate manifestation being the adoption of the position of the international secretariat of the Committee for a Workers International. The November 1996 statement of the CWI, 'The current situation and the tasks of the CWI', was the written form. The verbal process summed up in this statement had gone on over the previous 12 months. The formation of new workers' parties would remain a protracted process. Despite mass movements, "an alternative programme and/or system is not present in the consciousness of the masses ... in general on a world scale, a broad socialist consciousness is not present at the moment" (para 18); "... the complications of the period are reflected by the failure of any of the left/revolutionary organisations to grow substantially as a result of the [French] events of 1995-96" (para 23); "In pointing out these features of the period the IS/international executive committee is not drawing pessimistic conclusions or losing confidence in the decisive role of the working class" (para 27). Opportunities for growth would open up: "An indication of this has been shown in the dramatic growth of our section in Pakistan in the last two years ... we have the perspective of developing into a party of a few thousand in the short term" (para 35).
This perspective resulted in the abandonment in effect by the CWI of past methods of work, especially relating to 'united fronts', the adoption of the ludicrous "small mass parties", a turning inwards and a position of 'ourselves alone': "We know of no others but ourselves who can successfully build a revolutionary party" (Members Bulletin December 1998, p32). Such statements reflect a complete retreat into the sectarianism of party 'loyalty'.
This is not to say that everything was adopted all at once. There was a gradual stumbling towards this situation - not all of it can be considered to be conscious - but was driven partly by the impact of objective events and more decisively by a refusal to correct or even examine mistaken perspectives or positions. As the crisis unfolded, organisational methods were increasingly resorted to in order to resolve political differences. Again in the account given below a pattern can be traced in the approach towards political opposition. On the face of it 'democratic' debate is accorded. However, the very fact that the leading sections of the CWI have found themselves expelled or sent into 'exile' (in the case of Scotland) shows all is not what it seems on the surface. It also has to be recognised, as with the political crisis, that there has been (and there will continue to be) a zigzagging in policy and application. This is pertinent in relation to the policy of trying to build internationally through fusions.
Given the CWI perspective of this being an "unrevolutionary period", because consciousness has gone back to the level of only opposing the effects of the market, hence the emphasis on rebuilding with a new youth cadre, discarding the old 'tired out' elements and turning inwards to emphasise the need for party loyalty and 'ourselves alone'. Internationally, however, this obviously would find little resonance with other revolutionary groupings. Furthermore any open admission of this policy would leave the leadership open to criticism, especially within Britain.
This was especially the case with the Phil Hearse/John Bulaitis faction, who identified precisely this point in their opposition during the name change debate. Consequently to overcome this, the possibility of building "small mass revolutionary parties" was advanced. This had a dual purpose. Firstly it supposedly answered internal critics; secondly it served as a 'revolutionary' position from which to discuss with other groupings, in the hope that new forces could either be drawn into the CWI or create new areas of work and contacts. The proof of this is shown in the CWI/SP dealings with the likes of Pakistan, Scotland and Merseyside. Whilst there was the possibility of forging international contacts, the disputes with these areas were conducted either behind the scenes (this had already been perfected with the South African and American comrades) or the areas were politically marginalised.
During the period from 1995-97 Pakistan was praised in the international forums: "Pakistan would come to Europe" in the sense that parties would be able to grow very rapidly (International secretariat Members Bulletin No21, February 1997). Then in November 1997, partly because Pakistan voted against the expulsion of the American comrades, there was muted criticism of the work of the section. Eight months later they had been effectively expelled. Similarly with Scotland and Merseyside. In the discussions with the DSP, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (USFI), the International Workers League (LIT), the Unified International of Workers (UIT) and many others, these areas were held up as the revolutionary bastions of the CWI, then within a period of 12 months all the leading comrades on Merseyside were effectively expelled and Scotland attacked as being liquidationist and centrist. Why?
A succinct answer is: because of the adoption nationally of the "unrevolu-tionary" perspective and because organisationally the international fusions were going nowhere, ultimately a decision was taken to break free from internal opposition and criticism and adopt the Leninist position of 1907 - of retreating into a tight-knit, theoretically correct organisation. This means inculcate 'party loyalty' even to the point of sectarianism, defend the fundamental principles, build new youth cadres and wait for a historical period, until a new wave of struggle creates the conditions for the rebuilding of genuine revolutionary forces. In this the SP is not alone.
United front work
United front work nowadays is characterised by the Socialist Party as "networking". It will create an audience who will then subsume the revolutionary party, except in those areas where it seems that such work can help to build the influence of the CWI. One such case is the activity of comrades on the west coast of America. There the Progressive Left Slate (PLS) includes comrades from the Left Opposition Magazine (LOM) who subsequently joined Militant Labor and the CWI. Together with a series of community and non-governmental organisations, they put forward candidates for elections. LOM played a leading political role in the Immigrant Rights Movement. In the past they saw themselves as primarily a cadre organisation engaging in broad campaigns, but not putting any emphasis on recruitment, and for a period (1991-2) published a cultural magazine with political content.
Given their experience of being expelled from the LIT, they have a special interest in the application of democratic centralism and they favour the regroupment of genuinely revolutionary forces, arguing for moves to overcome the ideological baggage of obsolete differences which divide revolutionaries and put forward the idea of a revolutionary united front. The PLS does not include 'socialist' in its name or programme, but it is certainly making a big impact. Little seems to differ from their work and the work of the Scottish comrades, yet the SSP is attacked for having a centrist, reformist programme.
Open united front work was characterised by the Gauche R‚volution-naire (French Revolutionary Left), as "a permanent concern ... precisely because they [Militant] are no longer inside the traditional parties" (International Bulletin No19, October 1993). Five years later it has to be said that united front work, as understood in the past, has been abandoned. The evidence of this can be seen in the national retreat from any involvement in the Liverpool dockers' dispute, characterised in October 1996 as being in the final phase of struggle (16 months before the dispute ended), and the splits with Scotland and Pakistan.
Youth work
The first stages of re-orientating the organisational policies which flowed from the IS perspectives were taken in Britain in relation to the youth work, considered to be decisive in creating new cadres and leaders to replace the 'tired old guard'. Youth against Racism in Europe (YRE) was launched in 1992 following initiatives from sections in Austria and Belgium. In this new, broad youth movement it was agreed there was no need to have either socialism in the name or the programme. Correctly in Merseyside's view, Engels was quoted: "When Marx founded the International, he drew up the general rules in such a way that all working class socialists could join it ... Had we from 1864-73 insisted on working together only with those who openly adopted our programme where should we be today?" (K Marx, F Engels Letter to Wischnewetsky, 1887 Correspondence - a point of some interest in relation to Scotland and Merseyside's work around Resistance).
The conclusion was drawn to "aim to build the YRE as a broad youth movement, under our leadership, with non-comrades seeing it as their movement [our emphasis] and being involved in its running at all levels". For a period of three years the YRE produced spectacular results.
On Merseyside 20,000 attended a YRE festival. Months later up to 40,000 gathered in Brussels at a European-wide demo. Merseyside also launched the national YRE album. In the addendum to the 1993 youth resolution it was pointed out that "the music industry thought it was one of the best compilation albums this year ... combining work on the demo with publicity for the album will push up sales and make a considerable profit for the YRE" (Members Bulletin No11, 1993). Had this work been sustained, it would have built an important base which could have been used throughout Europe, eastern Europe, Russia and the CIS throughout the 1990s.
Instead in September 1995 this initiative began to be wound up. A debate developed around whether or not Militant should set up a Militant Labour Youth Section and the discussion was carried over to the congress. Nationally it was argued that the YRE should continue in its established form whilst not opposed to local initiatives around ML youth. For a period it looked as though broad forms of work would continue. Whatever type of youth organisation we were to have, it seemed clear that it would be similar to YRE. Youth "want to have their own space, their own organisation ... Militant Labour is a very distinct organisation with its own very defined programme and strategy ... We want to build an organisation they can be involved in without necessarily having to adopt such a precisely defined programme" (Interview with Lois Austin Socialism Today May 1996).
At the January 1996 conference the decision was taken, supported by Merseyside, to set up a socialist youth organisation. In hindsight it is clear that this turnaround - from supporting broad-based youth work around the YRE to a socialist youth organisation - had more to do with Scargill launching the SLP. In the 'youth strategy' document it was admitted that a minority of youth were drawing socialist conclusions, but nevertheless there was a need to launch such an organisation, which incidentally has never got off the ground.
And with the new perspectives of the IS the true import of the youth discussion becomes clear - when viewed in conjunction with the landing of a political bombshell on the NC a few months earlier with the intention of changing the name of the organisation. During this debate the full impact of the 'unrevolutionary period' perspective became very clear: "The capitalists have enormously boosted their profitability ... Significant sections of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries have suffered an undermining of their living standards since the 1970s, as well as a series of setbacks on the industrial and political planes" (Members Bulletin No20, November 1996). Furthermore, "They [Phil Hearse and co] do not recognise the fragmentation, disintegration and disorientation over the recent period of the former organised, class-conscious, socialist left" (ibid).
In Germany the Party of Democratic Socialism evolved from the Stalinist communist party. "They are also attractive because they have relatively more open and democratic structures than the other parties. Sympathisers can participate - with some restrictions - in party life, even becoming delegates to the national conference. Political tendencies have the right to form factions and platforms with their own structures, and ask for financial means from the party to support them ... Every individual member has the right to send in resolutions to the national conference which have to be dealt with if supported by 35 delegates. National committee meetings are open to members. In this way, the impression is rightly given of a democratic party with open debate" (emphasis added - A Bankert Socialism Today February 1996).
Chronology of events - International fusions/splits
In 1993 the CWI generally adopted the tactic of open work. It seemed for a period that a new era was to open up, but in May 1995 the announcement was made of a major split in the South African section. Little material was distributed at the time, beyond the national committee and the members' bulletins, although the issues were sufficiently serious as to warrant the warning from the IS that the whole philosophy of Marxism would have to be defended. The particular example of South Africa is of interest not only politically, but also organisationally, in so far as this was to become the common currency in regard to the opposition of American, Pakistani, and Scottish and Merseyside comrades. Organisationally, Paul Storey stood accused: "In the last few months he has come out openly ... long ago adopted unMarxist conclusions ... pursued his own agenda ... step-by-step silent liquidation of the organisation." In fact, as the quotation at the beginning of this document shows [see Weekly Worker March 18 1999 - ed], Paul had been raising these ideas for four or five years.
Also in 1995 the central committee of full-timers was abolished in favour of a national committee made up of full-timers and rank and file comrades. In and of itself this was a good move, but it became clear that there was an ulterior motive to this: a new generation of comrades were needed, the "old guard" no longer being up to the task. The idea of changing the name was floated into the national committee in September 1995 and the national conference was postponed until January 1996 (most annual conferences are postponed: no regular date has ever been established, despite repeated protests by the areas).
Such a radical shift came too late. Scargill declared his intention to form the Socialist Labour Party in November 1995, so to try and regain some ground national initiatives were proposed around Socialist Alliances (March 1996). Combined with the name change came the effective abandonment of the YRE and the launch of Young Socialist Resistance (May 1996). In October 1996 the specially convened conference agreed the name change from Militant to Socialist Party. May 1997 then saw the suspension/expulsion of the American minority, to be followed within a year by the disagreements/suspension/expulsion of Scotland and Pakistan. Merseyside followed soon afterwards (November 1998).
Internationally the policy had been adopted to explore the possibility of fusing with other revolutionary groups. This partly flowed from the recruitment/fusion of Phil Hearse (November 1994) and the JCR (Revolutionary Communist Youth) in France (September 1993), and also from the adoption of the policies described above. Realising it was a massive departure from the past orientation, the IS even issued a special statement. From 1995 onwards important contacts were made with the USFI and LIT. In fact in 1996 three representatives of the CWI attended the IEC of the USFI. Likewise with the Democratic Socialist Party of Australia (DSP).
The stated intention, in 1995, was of "entering into discussions with USFI, LIT, PSTU [United Socialist Workers Party, Brazil] and other groups to engage in a dialogue on the issues now facing the revolutionary left and to explore the possibilities of a regroupment and unification of genuine revolutionary forces". In a letter to the central committee of the PSTU the point was made that "the CWI has an important role to play in the process [of building a new international]. So have other groupings, parties and new forces. We do not believe that we are the 'only' force from which a powerful international will emerge (Letter sent to CC of the PSTU, January 30 1995 - Members Bulletin No10, April 1995). "The CWI proclaimed it had substantial forces in Europe, Africa and South East Asia, whilst the LIT had substantial forces in Latin America, and therefore discussions should take place between the various organisations. What happened in these discussions is unclear - little has been published or made available to the membership.
In 1997 the CWI international executive committee was attended by observers from the Lutte OuvriŠre minority, Voix des Travailleurs, the LIT, DSP and the Proposta group from Communist Refoundation in Italy - and most importantly from the UIT and the MST (Movement of Workers towards Socialism). Incidentally a UIT Brazilian MP declared in a meeting in Argentina that "the CWI represents the struggle of the proletariat from Pakistan to Liverpool" (Report to Merseyside committee from the February 1998 national committee - a rather ironic comment when viewed in retrospect).
What is clear is after a six-week tour of Latin America, in late 1997, there was little prospect of fusions/unifications taking place. At the same time the expulsion of the American minority was confirmed by the IEC with only Pakistan voting against. This led to an immediate deterioration in relations with the leadership of this section and the beginnings of factional activity within the section by the IS.
There now began a direct cooling in relations with the various international groupings. By 1998 the DSP had become a sectarian ex-Trotskyist organisation. The lack of any progress, internationally, was accompanied by an internal turning inward, reflected in suspensions, splits and expulsions from the CWI. In Brazil a small section of comrades left. In Austria, Australia and Berlin small groups were expelled, but these received little, if any attention.
Effects on the British organisation
The British section of the CWI has been regarded as the jewel in the crown, something to be held up to the other sections as a model. Within Britain, Liverpool and the Scottish section were two key areas of mass revolutionary involvement. In recent years Pakistan and Southern Ireland also became important areas, to be pointed to as examples of the success of the international work. How then can it be explained that the many key areas are now outside of the CWI? In Britain, the political crisis reinforced the organisational crisis, squandering and mismanaging human, political and financial resources built up over decades. The financial crisis was used as an excuse to implement in effect a political agenda of centralising and concentrating the resources at the national centre, which in turn also controls and directs the work of the CWI. Again this dates from 1995.
Prior to this there had been dangers of centralisation, but the political authority and influence and input of the areas during the 1980s and early part of the 1990s had generally counteracted this; political and organisational autonomy had coexisted within the framework of a democratic centralist organisation. However, there had been tensions. Merseyside's opposition to the centralisation of the organisation went back to the days of the split. In the 1992 commission, established by the central committee, to look into the workings of the national centre a Merseyside representative presented the following statement: "The essence of the problem is the centralisation of practically everything through the EC. Either politically everything has to be sanctioned through one or two leading comrades ... the lack of freedom to improvise and experiment with new organisational forms has led to a degree of frustration and cynicism which has to be seen to be believed - not to mention those comrades who have who have simply lost hope and left ... Democratic centralism taken to this degree results in conformist methods of thinking: it almost seems like a heresy to raise anything other than what has been said for the last 10 years. The rank and file full-timers may say things in pubs, but they don't dare say the same thing openly or officially" (Unpublished correspondence submitted to the commission, 1991).
The passing of seven years has, if anything, reinforced this tendency towards centralisation. The reflection of these views is seen in the statements of the general secretary, who at the national committee declared that "serious differences lead to flabbiness and incoherence" (Notes from national committee, February 1998). Our view is the very opposite - serious differences can, if conducted in the right spirit and atmosphere, only lead to a strengthening and deepening of the party. Peter Taaffe's view was backed up by Lynn Walsh, who declared: "Too much autonomy in the 1980s led to political autonomy." Not satisfied with this, he then claimed that we "can't have a high degree of organisational autonomy without political autonomy" developing. (ibid). Lenin's view was rather different: "The autonomy of every Party organisation ... must become a reality" (VI Lenin CW Vol 10, p376). The 1991 commission report delivered to the central committee, whose contents were "not to be discussed outside the CC", was subsequently "left on the table"; "concrete proposals" would be brought before another CC (Report of control commission, 1991).
The 'shelving' of documents and discussions was to increasingly become a way of ignoring real discussions. Merseyside experienced this with the resolutions asking for future decisions on financial centralisation to be taken by the conference during the debate on the name change. After agreeing to remit the statement at the name change conference (November 1997), it was minuted that a national committee would discuss the issues. Similarly with the debate around prospects for European Monetary Union the EC agreed at the national conference to produce a document. In neither case did this happen.
Such methods have their own logic. Conferences were increasingly postponed. Despite the recommendation of the commission to have the annual event each November, two years would pass before a conference was organised. The timing of conferences, if critical issues were to be debated, centred around the mechanics of the EC garnering support for their position, or fitting it in with international debates and splits. The new Socialist Party established in 1997 has, in January 1999, no constitution, yet the Merseyside Committee has been suspended (effectively expelled, if you look at the example of the US comrades, who were refused leave to appeal at the November 1997 world congress). No one knows who owns and controls the assets of the party.
Contrast this with Merseyside. An area constitution was adopted in 1994; annual regional conferences were held with written reports; election of regional and national committee members took place by secret ballot; and the full-timers were annually appointed and approved by members voting. Moreover the area committee met on a regular monthly basis, again with written reports and financial records. Not everything was done perfectly, of course, because of the involvement in mass movements. In the course of discussions we have recognised many mistakes were made by the area. Paradoxically the area had been highly centralised in terms of the organisational apparatus, something which was recognised back in 1994.
In terms of mass work this was sometimes necessary, but everything can turn into its opposite. The mass work included the Walton by-election (1991), the unsuccessful defence of Terry Field's seat during the general election (1992), the involvement in mass campaigning work around the YRE (1993-94), the standing of candidates under Militant Labour, the involvement in a whole series of strikes and the 28-month dockers' dispute (1995-98). What democratic deficiencies there were arose primarily from these activities, from some of our own deficiencies and over the last five years from the creeping centralisation, whereby the proportion of subscriptions going from the area to the national centre increased from 60% to 90% (Members Bulletin December 1998), leaving few resources to communicate with the inactive sections of the membership.
Politically Merseyside has attempted to grapple with some of the complexities of the period. Above all it has adopted an approach that a many-sided discussion is needed. That because of the collapse of Stalinism many of the old divisions of the past are outmoded and consequently we cannot say that our organisation is the only one with the answers. Issues such as the recomposition of the movement, a new programme, a review of past perspectives and current tasks have been blithely ignored. We do not have a party simply because we proclaim it. In truth the forces of the Militant/SP have dwindled to a few hundred. In this there would be nothing to be ashamed of - it is a difficult period for revolutionary socialists and numbers do not count for everything. Far more important is a correct political analysis and programme and it is here that the organisation is now so wanting.
Unfortunately in the process many good comrades could be lost to the movement. Such an outcome would be tragic. Scotland has, in our opinion, shown the way forward. That is why we are appealing to comrades who have given a lifetime to building the Militant to join in the project of reassembling the forces nationally and internationally and join in the task of rebuilding genuine socialist parties based around revolutionary ideas.
The current course will only lead to isolation and sectarianism. On the other hand we have a chance, as we did with the Liverpool city council battles, the poll tax and the YRE, to show the superiority of our ideas in practice - and not just by proclaiming that we are the only people to be able to build. The key tasks are to work in the unions, but to also encourage autonomous unofficial movements which express militant class ideals; to participate and help to build socialist and class alliances; to work to create youth, environmental, anti-racist and women's struggles, justice networks - all based on federal, democratic structures as described above in relation to the PDS; to build the basis for a genuine mass workers' party and above all create the conditions for an International based on revolutionary principles.
In doing this, we can show in theory, and more importantly in practice, the superiority of revolutionary socialist ideas.
The Weekly Worker is willing to carry replies to the Merseyside critique
- especially from SP members.
Merseyside Socialists can be contacted at: 2 Lower Breck Road, Liverpool
L6 4BY. email:
liv_socialists@hotmail.com
Part I - Wrong global analysis
