Confused and inconsistent democracy
Allan Armstrong of the Scottish Socialist Party and Republican Communist Network slams the CPGB's position on the British-Irish
The following three therapies are recommended by different counsellors to a woman caught up in an unhappy marriage arranged long ago. This marriage has a continuous history of violence aggravated by her partner's addiction to a particular drug, which he has recently tried to force upon her:-
A: A clean break with the readoption of her maiden name and a rejection of the drug.
B: A continued commitment to the relationship but no resort to any self-protective measures which may be misinterpreted as hostile actions by her partner and merely aggravate him further. However, since the timings of his worst drug-induced excesses are by now well-known, avoiding him at these times is permissible. If she pursues this course with sufficient patience then at some time in the (distant) future he may see the error of his ways and arrange a second marriage on her terms.
C: Ask her partner initially to adopt her name as a token of his willingness to reform his behaviour. He can, however, continue with the use of his drug providing he finds a less adulterated source, although she should personally continue to reject it.
Now, if we identify this particular woman as 'Ireland', her marriage partner as 'Ulster', the drug as 'British', and the worst excesses as 'the Orange marching season', we won't find it hard to identify the three 'counsellors' concerned, since their 'therapies' are openly promoted in the usual 'trade' publications.
Therapy A hasn't been patented and is promoted in different forms by a wide array of communists, socialists and republicans in a variety of publications. Therapy B, also known as the CWI (Militant) Course, advertised in IS, has come under heavy criticism from others because it's diagnosis seems misguided. It seems to advocate a course of action which too closely resembles the woman's own actions at her weakest moments in the past. These only encouraged her partner's violence and addictions. Therapy C, the Conrad Course, has recently been marketed as a wonder cure. The journal, WW, now pushing this new therapy, used to promote a form of Therapy A. Yet despite the awe in which Conrad is held by the producers of WW, to others his therapy appears like a quack remedy. Our journal has decided to give the Conrad Course a trial run. What follows is a report of our findings.
The diagnosis
i) the theory
The first thing which needs examined is Conrad's diagnosis of the origins of the 'British-Irish', "an historically constituted and distinct community of people." "The British-Irish have continuously inhabited parts of what is Northern Ireland since the early 17th century. They were settled in Antrim and Down as a mass of 'strong farmers' - from England but mainly from Scotland - to pacify the most rebellious part of Gaelic and Anglo-Irish Ireland and hence ensure it for an absolutist British monarchy that had redefined itself according to its nationalised version of protestantism, i.e. Anglicanism." (Weekly Worker September 9 1999)
So, let us begin by examining these claims of a continuous British-Irish identity going back to the 17th century. There is considerable confusion here, both theoretically and historically. Conrad denies the existence of any manifestations of nation or nationality at such an early period as the early 17th century - well, except when it suits him. He has dismissed fellow therapist, David Craig, in the Weekly Worker (September 23 1999). Craig's "whole approach reeks of petty nationalism" because he has the temerity to suggest that there may be such things as "English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish nations". To Conrad these are nothing other than "crude Victorian inventions, designed to mystify the past and divide the working class." Yet fully two centuries before, Conrad has the presumably 'non-national' Scottish and English settlers "quickly stop[ping] being Scottish or English" as they formed another - hybrid - Irish [nationality] identity." (Weekly Worker September 9 1999)
If Conrad can push his chosen 'British-Irish' nationality back to the 17th century, he can't convincingly attack others who point out, with a lot more justification, that the English and Scottish had many of the features of a nationality, and England and Scotland, many of the features of a nation, during the same period. The notion and reality of nationality (a cultural group) and nation (the people in a given territorial area), arose alongside each other, with nation states becoming the dominant political form as capitalism extended its influence. In the 17th century the triumph of the wider nation-state still had to wait another century and a half, which meant that, in that century and for much of the 18th century, other forms of state (eg dynastic imperial) dominated much of the world. However, those European states which first developed a centralised monarchy ruling over a single geographical area, with an effective 'taxation' system and common currency, tended to emerge earlier as nation states. In particular, those states which early broke from the Catholic Church, establishing their own national churches, particularly in England, Scotland and Holland, proved to be early harbingers of the nations of the future, even if that wasn't their original intention.
Indeed, it was precisely the strength of national identity, already reached in Scotland by the end of the 17th century, which ensured that the United Kingdom, formed by the 1707 Act of Union, was a union state which recognised the existence of subordinate nations. The UK was not a federal state like the future USA or a unitary state like post-revolutionary France, neither of which recognised other national constituents of the state. The union state form was further underscored at the time Ireland joined the UK under the 1801 Act of Union, because of the still remaining strength of national feeling, despite the defeat of the 1798 United Irish Rising. Once again this Irish nation existed well before Conrad's Victorian 'myth-making', even if Irish 'sentiment' was divided between a wider Irish nation (Catholic, Dissenter and Anglican) and a narrower Anglo-Irish (largely Anglican) 'caste'. Therefore we can see that the UK state form preserved the English, Scottish and Irish nations (all at different stages of development) within it, and even allowed the emergence of a new Welsh nation, Wales having previously 'disappeared' as a political unit, under the 1535 Act of Union.
Certainly a nationalist or quasi-nationalist intelligentsia did develop strongly in Victorian times peddling all sorts of national myths in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland alike, but the real reason for the increasing political re/emergence of Irish, Scottish and Welsh nations was the extension of the franchise to the 'lower orders'. They felt these national identities more strongly than the Welsh gentry or the Scottish and Irish landlords and merchants, who had acquiesced with different degrees of enthusiasm to the respective Union treaties and helped eventually to form a real British ruling class. This is because the 'lower orders' already had vernacular communal and democratic traditions in opposition to the traditions of British monarchist imperialism and its local national allies.
ii) the case history
But having established that English, Scottish and Irish nations were largely formed well before Victorian times, let us examine historical developments in Ulster. What of Conrad's 'British-Irish', with "antecedents" going back to the 17th century? There was no British 'nation' (never mind 'British-Irish') in the 17th century. 'Britain', under the Union of the Crowns of 1603, was a dynastic term, which didn't extend to Ireland. With separate parliaments and churches in England and Scotland, most people would then have described themselves as English or Scots (or belonging to particular denominations, localities or even kindreds) but not British.
Next we have to deal with Conrad's poor history. Those in Ulster who came from Scotland were very mixed. Gaelic speaking Macdonnells from Scotland's western islands and Kintyre had long been settled in Antrim, and along with the 'native Irish' Gaels had eliminated Norman lordly and later English kingly control in this area. The Antrim branch of the Macdonnells, enjoyed the support of King James VI, because another branch of the family wanted to defiantly revive the Lordship of the Isles. James would probably have preferred to use the plantation option here, following the pattern he increasingly used from Lewis to the rest of Ulster, once he could draw on the greater resources of his united kingdoms, after the Union of the Crowns. However, with many of the planned plantations failing, he had to make use of whatever allies he could, including the Gaelic-speaking Macdonnells. Far from considering themselves British, they were hardly reconciled to thinking themselves as Scottish, seeing no contradiction in having a continuous Gaelic speaking realm stretching across the North Channel.
When lowland Scots were first planted in County Down, it was as part of a deal which involved the king, the undertakers (those licensed to 'plant') and the local Irish Gaelic lord, Conn O'Neill. However, as their numerical strength grew, the rapacious undertakers and merchants either displaced the 'native Irish' or forced them into servitude. The Scottish settlers these undertakers brought across were a mixture of Presbyterians (including Gaelic speaking Campbells), potentially troublesome Catholic recusants and very definitely troublesome Border outlaws, who were forcibly transplanted (or fled) once James VI had blocked their usual escape route into England, through the Union of the Crowns. Far from quickly forming a "British-Irish" identity", some of these Scots (perhaps mainly, but not only, the Gaelic speakers, recusants and outlaws) intermarried and merged with the Irish. The majority, however, did form a distinct, but largely Scotch-Irish Presbyterian culture, which was often in opposition to the Union state, and in particular to the established (Anglican) Church of Ireland.
Furthermore, just as there was some absorption of Scottish settlers by the 'native Irish', so there were conversions of 'native Irish' to Presbyterianism and intermixing of the descendants of Scots and English settlers in Ulster too. And of course, as the Penal Laws against Catholics took their toll after 1690, there was widespread 'native Irish' conversion to Anglicanism (since Presbyterians in Ireland still suffered political disabilities) and changing of Irish names to English forms. The myth of the longstanding division between the "protestant-British-Irish minority" and the Catholic Irish can be illustrated by looking at the very Scottish (and English surnames) of Danny Morrison, John Hume and Gerry Adams on the Irish nationalist side and the very Irish surnames of former Stormont premier, Sir Terence O' Neill, current Ulster Unionist spokesperson, Ken Maginnis and Lenny Murphy, the 'Shankhill Butcher', on the British, Ulster Unionist and loyalist side! The lines Conrad wants to draw are not so hard and fast, and there has been plenty of change over in identity, not just the stable 'British Irish' community Conrad claims.
One indication of the fluidity of nationality identification amongst Protestants, faced with a change of (or changing) state, is found in the massive emigration of largely Presbyterian settlers to the North American colonies in the 18th century. Note, that despite Conrad's insistence of an early merging of these settlers into a "hybrid Irish identity", history knows of no 'British-Irish' settlers at this time (despite the Union of the English and Scottish parliaments in 1707), whereas the Irish and Scotch-Irish (Presbyterian) settlers are well known to history as one of the bulwarks of the new American republicanism! When the revolutionary pulse in Europe quickened in the late 18th century, many of the Presbyterian Scotch-Irish, still remaining in Ulster, joined with numbers of the Dissenter Anglo-Irish, a small but significant number of the Anglican Anglo-Irish and large numbers of Catholic Irish to form the republican United Irishmen. The Irish nation became politically visible.
It was at precisely this time that the hybrid identity of 'British-Irish' really emerged in opposition to the revolutionary challenge of the United Irishmen and to the united nation (people) of Ireland. The initially Anglican-led Orange Order opened its ranks to Presbyterians, the better to create a common British sectarian front against this new united Irish challenge. The revolutionary Irish faced the counter-revolutionary British-Irish. It was the defeat of the former which led to the wholesale shift amongst the majority of Irish Protestants towards a 'British-Irish' identity in the 19th century. However, even significant numbers of the better-off Catholics adopted this identity too, at the official urging of their Church. The Catholic Church wanted the Catholics in Ireland politically mobilised, not just to abolish any remaining Penal Laws, but to remove the political and economic disabilities their coreligionists still faced 'on the mainland'.
Therefore, during the 19th century, British-Irish identity wasn't synonymous with Protestantism but enjoyed Catholic Irish support, with largely Catholic Irish regiments in the British army building the Empire, along with mainly Protestant Irish, British-English, British-Scottish, British-Welsh and indeed, many regiments drawn from the colonies. But old class divisions still remained strong enough for the British-Irish to be divided for much of the century between Whig and old Liberal on one side and Tory and Conservative on the other. When the widening franchise permitted the 'lower orders' to vote, these political alignments were increasingly displaced by the division between Irish Home Rule Party and the Irish Unionists, as the reality of the 'lower orders'-dominated Irish nation made its impact. Yet some Protestant Irish supported Irish Home Rule in opposition to the large Protestant (and small and declining Catholic) majority of British-Irish who supported direct British rule from Westminster.
The highpoint of the British-Irish coincided with the heyday of the British Empire between 1850 and the 1880's. From then on two new challenges began to have a mass influence. The longer-term influence of the revolutionary Fenians, combined with the extension of the franchise first to the male 'lower orders', led to Irish nationality displacing this relatively new 'British-Irish' nationality, primarily, but not exclusively, amongst the Catholic Irish.
The landlord-led Irish Unionists (who remained British-Irish), now increasingly looked for 'mainland' allies amongst the reactionary British Tories and the British officer class to compensate for their shrinking social and political weight in Ireland itself. But as the Irish national democratic challenge grew in strength, culminating in the Irish Revolution of 1916-21, British-Irish identity faced a different challenge, this time from within, leading once more to a wholesale shift of identity. This new identity was Ulster-British and its leadership was an alliance of industrialists and landlords. Although they once more mobilised the old cross-class Orange Order, this in itself wasn't sufficient in the new world of mass politics. Hence the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force, which socialists later understood as akin, not just to Tsarist Russia's anti-semitic, pogrom-promoting Black Hundreds, but as precursors of the fascist organisations which emerged after the First World War.
Just as British-Irish identity had initially been forged in the counter-revolutionary assault of the Orange Order, Irish militia and British regiments on the United Irishmen of the 1790's, so the new Ulster-British identity was forged in the counter-revolutionary assault of the Ulster Volunteer Force, the later British Black and Tans and what was to become the Royal Ulster Constabulary on the Irish democratic movement from 1912 to 1921. Although the Unionists hesitated, when the British government offered them a devolved 'Northern Irish' parliament (preferring direct rule from Westminster), those from Ulster soon saw the possibilities of creating a 'Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People' and of drawing a new line to uphold British and Protestant supremacy.
Therefore, the Irish-British (including the Unionists living in the three counties of Free State 'Ulster') were largely abandoned to their fate, which, for the large majority who didn't emigrate, meant within one or two generations becoming Irish. As for those "million British-Irish" whom Conrad has identified still living in the "one and four half counties" of north-eastern Ireland, they are increasingly a figment of his imagination. By 1968, only 20% of Northern Ireland Protestants considered themselves Irish, with 8% opting for British-Irish or Anglo-Irish identities. Instead 32% thought of themselves as having an Ulster identity. By 1990 Protestants considering themselves Irish (including only 3% specifically British-Irish) had declined to 7%, whilst 26% gave themselves a 'Northern Irish' (the official sectarian statelet name form) or Ulster identity. With the abolition of Stormont in 1973, those claiming British identity rose from 39% in 1968 to a high of 77% in 1984, just before the introduction of the detested Anglo-Irish Agreement, which prompted a decline of a simple British identity amongst Protestants back to 66% by 1990 (Source. Table 3:3 - Self descriptions of their national identity by Northern Ireland Protestants, p.110 Explaining Northern Ireland John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary).
iii) the current condition and likely developments
The current British government policy of restoring Stormont will most likely have the effect of increasing Ulster-British identity, once more largely at the expense of a mainly British identity, especially with the leadership of the Republican Movement giving de facto legitimisation to Partition. Therefore, it isn't inconceivable that Ulster-British, or more likely, Northern Irish-British identity will spread top-down into the Catholic community, as British government funding is found for an expanding middle class of "professional community workers, researchers, analysts, government advisors, funders, funding experts, statisticians, conflict resolutionists, cultural traditionalists, development officers, consultants, inter-agency specialists..." (Reinforcing Powerlessness - The hidden dimension to the Northern Ireland 'Troubles', Michael Hall). During the period of low level violence and increased government economic and social expenditure in Northern Ireland in the 1960's, enough Catholics benefited, particularly through higher education, (despite the sectarian bias of the local Orange statelet) for some Catholics to be able to identify with the partitionist Northern Ireland Labour Party.
But here is the catch. If the Irish democratic movement regains its currently lost momentum, these Ulster-British are not miraculously going to re-emerge as Conrad's British-Irish. Another wave of Irish revolutionary democratic struggle in Ireland will produce another counter-revolutionary response. Although a continued Ulster-British component to this can not be ruled out, if reactionary allies are to be found 'on the mainland' (and the Tory right and the fascist BNP and NF have long cultivated such connections) the outlines of yet another identity change are already being debated. This won't have any official remaining British component, but will be marked by an attempt to create a repartitioned and independent 'Ulster' state for Protestants only. 'Ulster nationality' would then displace 'Ulster-British' or 'Northern Irish/British nationality'. Already loyalist 'think-tanks' have made some headway in assembling the cultural components of this growing Ulster identity, by getting recognition for the Ulster Scots dialect in the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, the Ulster Defence Army has already discussed their 'doomsday scenario' of a final British 'betrayal', if the British state did seem to be about to abandon 'Ulster'. They propose to achieve their repartitioned 'Ulster' (with boundaries very similar to those suggested by Conrad!) by a process of 'nullification' of Catholics (and other 'disloyal elements'), ie ethnic cleansing. The cultural insignia of a proposed independent 'Ulster', particularly the use of Cuchulainn, (a mythical Pictish-Ulster warrior who fought the invading Gaelic Irish in the mists off time) already adorn the gable walls of loyalist housing schemes; whilst, from the picketing of Harryville Church to the bombing and burning out of Catholics living in Antrim, the message is being forcibly put across now, that Catholics aren't welcome in their new Ulster.
Of course, the underpinnings of British identity in Ulster may be undermined 'on the mainland', with the break-up of 'Great Britain', leaving England, Scotland and Wales. What cultural contortions this would mean for an Ulster loyalism finally deprived of any real 'Britness' and the possible ending of the Crown, can't be anticipated - but it would not be a pretty sight! Either way, 'British' hyphenated identity is a declining force.
iv) an alternative diagnostic assessment
It is clear from this analysis that the 'British-Irish' have a much shorter historical existence than Conrad maintains and the strength of this identity is directly related to the strength of the UK imperial monarchist state, with its maximum support at the highpoint of the British Empire. At that time those of a British-Irish identity included Catholics, so historically, Protestantism can not be considered an exclusive cultural marker. This state-promoted British-Irish identity has always been in opposition to 'the risen people' of Ireland. The class leadership came initially from the landlords and later from the large manufacturers, with strong support from demagogic Protestant ministers. The class leadership of the Irish national democratic movement was initially based on the emerging Irish intelligentsia, small manufacturers and farmers and, on the more revolutionary wing, on the artisans and tenant farmers and later on, the working class. And it is worth re-emphasising that this popular movement can not be exclusively identified with Catholics either. There has always been some contribution from those of a Protestant background.
Whenever, the Irish national democratic movement took on a mass revolutionary form (under the United Irishmen in the 1790's and Sinn Fein and the Irish Citizens Army at the beginning of this century) British-Irish identity was central to the counter-revolutionary forces (the Orange Order and the early Ulster Volunteer Force). However, any counter-revolutionary future lies not in British-Irishness (its new '26 Counties' adherents like Conor Cruise O'Brien, notwithstanding), because it is already been largely displaced by Ulster-Britishness. And of course, this Ulster-Britishness still plays exactly the same counter-revolutionary role as before, as 'the Troubles' of the last 30 years have demonstrated, with Irish Republicanism (and Peoples Democracy) confronted by the Ulster Defence Army/UFF, UVF and RUC backed by British regiments.
Conrad's therapy
Conrad, having to his satisfaction diagnosed 'the British-Irish' as "an historically constituted and distinct community of people...continuously inhabit[ing] parts of Northern Ireland since the 17th century", now comes up with his therapy. Communists should support the right of the British-Irish to territorial self-determination. And presumably, since Conrad's 'British-Irish' are a bit thin on the ground today, he would extend this demand to the majority of 'actually existing' British in Northern Ireland - the Ulster-British, who do indeed form quite a considerable political and cultural force.
He would be quite wrong to do so, since Ulster-Britishness (like British-Irishness before it) is an identity which can not be politically separated from the reactionary monarchist and unionist British state which has promoted it. In contrast, and indeed in opposition, the Irish nation was built up from below, initially under the leadership of the popular classes, although there were always Irish from the better-off classes prepared to ally with the British; and once the Irish Free State, later the '26 Counties Republic', was formed, a new top-down nation identity could be promoted by the state there too. This left the task of trying to unite Ireland primarily to the popular classes amongst the oppressed in the 'Six Counties'. And again, it must be re-emphasised that this popular Irish nation has always drawn Protestants to its banner, albeit a minority. Both Connolly and Larkin showed (and they could hardly be accused of hiding their commitment to an Irish republic) that it was possible to unite Catholics and Protestants, even in such barren territory as Belfast, particularly when republicanism was linked to social demands. Hence the significance of the Workers' Republic slogan. Indeed, so powerful was their pull, that Captain Jack White, who came from an Anglo-Irish landlord background and had served in the British Army in the Boer War, used his military training to drill the Irish Citizens Army!
Conrad is, of course, quite right to point out the difficulty of maintaining large scale Catholic and Protestant working class unity on a sustained basis. It is possible to point out quite a degree of intermixing through marriage and other social intercourse. There are also some remarkable jumps over the sectarian divide. One-time prominent INLA/IRSP member, Ronnie Bunting was the son of Iain Paisley's former side-kick, Major Ronald Bunting; whilst Gusty Spence, one-time UVF commander, has a brother married to a Catholic, living in nationalist Belfast! But, countering this has been the effect of growing residential segregation of Protestants and Catholics, particularly in working class areas. Similarly, whatever cross-border cooperation Irish and 'Ulster' businessmen find profitable, economic forces alone won't achieve unity for the working class. The task remains a political one, however difficult. But the best of such unity that has been achieved, has been by Protestants joining with their Catholic brothers and sisters in both the Irish republican and Irish socialist movements.
Conrad attributes Steve Riley's refusal to support territorial self determination for the 'British Irish' as being "like a dyed-in-the wool Irish nationalist... resigned to an unchanging British-Irish population." (Weekly Worker September 9 1999) Actually, it is the other way round. Conrad can not conceive of such change. In the past, the 'British-Irish' have changed to both Ulster-British or Irish identities, mainly depending on which side of the Partition line they ended up living. Yes, for many there was a degree of reluctance in making such a change, but the most consistent class fighters amongst the Protestants joined Irish republican, socialist and Communist organisations. If we are to achieve Irish unity from below, then this must be by revolutionary democratic methods, which means that our class must hold its Irish Workers Republican banner high, and every historical precedent shows that the opposition will come from the loyal British, with whatever hyphen - British-Irish or Ulster-British - backed by her majesty's loyal British regiments, whether they be recruited in England, Scotland, Wales or Ireland. There can be little doubt that this struggle to achieve Irish working class unity will, as in the past, be a struggle against the British state and all political forms of British identity.
We can't say that all forms of British political identity will disappear in the struggle - but we can say that they will overwhelmingly line up with the forces of reaction. After a successful struggle to achieve Irish unity there may still be, for example, remaining branches of the Orange Order. Even the existing 26 Counties Irish state has annual Orange marches at Rossnowlagh and Manorcunningham in Donegal. However, a march which takes place courtesy of the Irish authorities, policed by the Garda, doesn't seem to have the same allure for loyalists as Drumcree or the Ormeau Road! There will also be many cultural manifestations of 'Britishness' which will be slowly absorbed in any new Irish state. After centuries of mutual contact, even the nationalist population has been deeply effected by cultural aspects of Britishness. The Gaelic Athletic Association organises its sports and gains partisan support on the county basis bequeathed by English and later, the British authorities!
Delaying the treatment
But perhaps the most bizarre aspect of the 'Conrad therapy' is he argues that his 'British-Irish' should only have the right to territorial self-determination after all of Ireland, including Northern Ireland has broken from the Union. Why should the 'British-Irish' practice a democratic self-denying ordinance to join with their Irish comrades, brothers and sisters to win Irish unity and expel the British state (their best guarantee of continued 'Britishness'), and then suddenly feel 'British-Irish' enough to want to exercise their right to have local referenda, in which of course, following Conrad, they will vote against secession! Conrad doesn't want communists to be tied to formal logic, but we can surely expect some connection between Conrad's 'logical' treatment and any likely reality!
Now some of Conrad's shell-shocked comrades have looked to 'dubious' external political forces, eg Sean Matgamna (AWL) and Dave Craig (RDG) to explain his latest turn. A much more likely reason, is the CPGB-PCC's political retreat in the face of Blair's 'New unionist' offensive. This is clearly shown in Conrad's insistence that, after quarter of a century of high-cost conflict, the capitalist class in Britain and Ireland "do have a manifest incentive to deliver a peaceful solution". Conrad is right not to rule out the possibility of capitalism finding a 'solution' to their problem - which is the existence of 'communities of resistance' providing infertile soil for capitalist exploitation. However, the trajectory of the post-Good Friday Agreement is not towards an imperially imposed united Ireland, but to an imperially imposed reorganisation of Partition. But whether the "solution" is peaceful or not is secondary to the capitalists. If the Republican leadership can lower political expectations and force the acquiescence of the 'communities of resistance' to becoming super-exploited enclaves of low-waged labour, then the British state will permit a 'peaceful' solution. But just in case that fails, the UK state does have a Plan B - which is why the British Army isn't 'decommissioning' and is readmitting convicted killers to its ranks!
Steve Riley has rightly pointed out the first hints of a new view in Conrad's writings. Despite Conrad's shrill insistence on maintaining his commitment to Irish unity, there is a suggestion that maybe the national democratic struggle no longer has a progressive role to play. "The antagonism between the British-Irish and catholic-Irish is not a 'theoretical' abstraction nor an invention of Jack Conrad's. On the contrary it has dominated Irish politics for the last hundred years. The poles of oppression would in all probability be reversed in a united Ireland not brought about by the leadership of the working class" (Weekly Worker September 23 1999).
This is sliding very close to the 'warring tribes' approach peddled by Militant/Socialist Party, with the role of British imperialism and the UK state airbrushed out of history. Instead the conflict is seen as between "the British-Irish and the catholic Irish". Furthermore, it is the "catholic Irish" who are given a religious label, suggesting that the British-Irish have risen above sectarianism. If all we can see is a reversal of "the poles of oppression" then perhaps the continuation of Partition is the lesser of possible evils and perhaps indeed we should forge ahead with a partitionist CPUK! Conrad's new turn is unstable and hasn't yet reached a settled point, but it undoubtedly represents a political retreat. We have already seen the notion of a CPUK aired in the pages of the Weekly Worker, with its acceptance of Partition (part of a long accommodationist tradition within official Communism inside Ireland itself).
It is not entirely clear in Conrad's prescription, but the logic of some of his arguments would appear to be that communists should take up the 'British-Irish' right of territorial self determination because the capitalist class could bring about Irish unity in a counter-revolutionary manner from above. Perhaps he isn't ruling out the possibility that the combined forces of the British, Irish and US governments and the EU want a politically united Ireland and this could be imposed on the Ulster-British - Gerry Adams, dream on! But for Conrad, such a 'solution' would leave his 'British-Irish' as an oppressed minority. This scenario would prompt the Ulster-British to become 'Ulster' nationalists, refusing the 'Irish Union' for their four county 'Ulster Confederacy'. We could then expect to see a local version of the Ku Klux Klan, which shares many of the features of extreme loyalism. It certainly wouldn't be very auspicious territory for communists to intervene in. In attempting to relate to such reaction, they could end up in a similar mess to the South African Communist Party in the white miners' Rand Strike of 1922. Their slogan was " Workers of the World, Unite and Fight for a White South Africa"!
Now, if Irish unity was imposed in such a manner from above, and if the international forces of law and order lifted the worst criminals from Irish prisons or scoured the seminaries for old-style 'soldiers of God' to form the new police force in 'Ulster', then yes, it would be the duty of communists to win support for the victims of such repression. However, in answer to another unlikely scenario, invoked by Tom Delargy, of a "victorious republican movement" successfully uniting Ireland by militarily defeating the British and imposing "a powerful reactionary gang exacting revenge against the protestant people as people", (Weekly Worker September 23 1999) we get the following response from Conrad. "Does protestant blood really have to flow down the Shankhill (sic) Road in order to get you {Tom} to propose self-determination?" Well, Protestant blood did flow down the Shankhill Road, as a result of the IRA bombing in October 1993 but Conrad didn't raise such a demand then! Surely Conrad realises that the only get-out clause he has left himself in the face of this contradiction, is hardly likely to buttress his claims of "consistent democracy", or win much support amongst the 'British-Irish' (read Ulster British) for communists. For Conrad, self determination and freedom from bombing and flowing blood are only on offer after Irish unity. Does Conrad seriously think such a line of argument will win over his 'British-Irish' now, or in the future?
Today's reality is that the British state is trying to rebuild Northern Irish-Britishness to include the Catholic middle class, the better to marginalise and fragment the largely working class republican 'communities of resistance'. However, as long as the loyalist working and middle classes remain committed to the UK in the here and now, they remain more dependable for the British state than a Catholic middle class still to be fully won over. When the ship of state is sinking, clinging on to a stinking old hulk like HMS 'Loyal Ulster' still remains a better bet for troubled Captain Blair than abandoning ship for a paper plan of the beautifully fitted-out, seats-for-all lifeboat, 'Good Friday'. Which is why loyalist provocations, from the year-round build-up to Drumcree, the picketing of Harryville Church and the pipe-bombing of Catholic homes in East Antrim, features far lower in British government concerns than the not yet decommissioned IRA arms. Communist support is for the oppressed in the here and now. It is the nationalist population of the 'Six Counties' which needs our support, not some putatively oppressed 'British-Irish' group in the future, especially given the oppressing role of Unionism and loyalism past and present.
Advancing from Therapy A
But of course, communists must offer their programme for the future as well. Communists make their plans, not on the basis of capitalist success, but on the basis of mobilising revolutionary democratic opposition. And, as long as Irish unity - first and foremost the unity of workers - remains central to our immediate programme, then we have to look to how to achieve this. The reason we still want Irish unity is to unite an imperially divided Irish working class and to weaken and destroy a major imperial state, the UK, by working class-led democratic struggle throughout these islands.
So, if we are appealing to Conrad's 'British-Irish' as communists and revolutionary democrats what are we asking them to give up and what do we offer? It has already been made clear that 'British-Irishness' and 'Ulster-Irishness' are intrinsically linked to the British state. Precisely because of the fragility of such identity, it is strongly associated with the permanent or semi-permanent mobilisation of reaction (and when necessary, counter-revolution) under the banner of the Union Jack - the Orange Order, Royal Ulster Constabulary, Royal Irish Regiment and their auxiliaries in the UVF, UDA/UFF and the LVF, with clerical backing from Protestant hellfire ministers preaching from churches and halls flying the same flag (for surely such Christianity is for the 'chosen people', not for all humankind!) This 'Britishness' has to be combated politically.
There was a time when the CPGB-PCC liked to put forward the slogan, 'For the IRA, Against the British Army'. Applying the same principle, we could adopt the slogan 'For the Irish nation, Against the British state'. Like the first slogan, this is conditioned by the nature of the struggle in progress. For what we want to see is the mobilisation of all the revolutionary democratic forces of Ireland (atheist, agnostic, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and others, for Ireland is now more mixed than in the past). This will of necessity bring them into confrontation with 'Britishness' in all its political forms, since it has no democratic content. However, a revolutionary democratic mobilisation will also come into conflict with the Irish state and therefore with reactionary Irish nationalism. The willingness of Connolly and Larkin to hit southern Irish capitalists and their Irish nationalist apologists hard, is one reason they could make some impact on Protestants in Ireland. This is a further reason why communists should remain united in Ireland (and not divide on partition lines) since to win over the best Protestants today, the one communist organisation must be seen to confront the existing Irish state and Catholic reaction in the south.
Naturally, if your communism is of an abstract propagandist stripe, then this championing of Irish national democracy against British 'national' reaction will be viewed as merely capitulation to nationalism. However, this would be rather like saying that you opposed workers striking for higher wages, since all that did was confirmed the existence of wage slavery and hence capitalism. Such a view fails to recognise that our class learns the real nature of capital, with its two contradictory poles between exploiter and exploited, in the course of struggle. Similarly, communists can not just step outside the existence of a nation/s state system and therefore have to relate to the democratic and socialist traditions within each nation, drawing a distinction between the oppressor and oppressed. Our class learns the oppressive nature of the capitalist state in the course of democratic struggle.
Deprived of their 'Britishness', Protestant workers can still be shown their own democratic and socialist contributions both to Irish national liberation and to confronting capitalism. In both the north and the south, Catholicism and Protestantism are becoming increasingly a cultural marker, with fewer people holding strongly-held specifically religious convictions (although religious adherence remains considerably higher than over here). There is also considerable inter-marriage and other relationships between Catholics and Protestants (something again, which extreme 'Ulster-British' loyalists are to the forefront of opposing -witness the killing of the Quinn twins, born to a lapsed Catholic married to a Protestant in Ballymoney, the murder of Bernadette Martin, because of her relationship with a Protestant boy in largely loyalist Aghaloe, and the killing of Catholic and Protestant friends, Damien Traynor and Philip Allen in Poyntzpass.
However, Conrad himself outlines a thesis which for once does put forward a principled democratic demand in relation to Protestants. "There must be no discrimination against protestants. They must be at liberty to practice their religion." But to this Conrad adds the demand that they must be "encouraged to freely develop the progressive side of their culture." (Thesis 11, Weekly Worker August 26 1999). The problem here is, if you award the 'British-Irish' the freedom to exercise territorial self-determination, then as a "consistent democrat" you have to allow them to freely develop their reactionary side of their culture! It's a strange self-determination where somebody else decides which way you can 'develop'.
The answer here, of course, is that Protestants, or the Ulster British in Ireland, for that matter, aren't a distinct 'nation' but an ethno-religious group ( a particular form of nationality - a category that applies to groups of people not territories). Therefore the appropriate democratic rights which are extended in such cases apply to groups of people, not to territories. Conrad opposes this fundamental point. (We are tempted to say he departs from the "ABC of Marxism", one of his own favourite phrases. However, Marxism isn't a formula which can be learnt by rote and applied externally. Conrad's rather frequent resort to the "ABC of Marxism" is more designed for internal CPGB-PCC consumption, to establish orthodoxy and silence any possible critics).
But since Conrad holds up the 'holy texts', let us examine how Lenin dealt with the issue of nation and nationality as part of the minimum ( or immediate) programme. In the RSDLP proposals to the Second International Socialist Conference held in Kienthal in Switzerland in March 1916, Lenin wrote the following. "The Russian socialist who does not fight for freedom to secede for the Ukraine, Finland, etc, against the war over Poland, the Italian socialist who does not fight for freedom to secede for Tripoli, Albania, etc, the Dutch socialist who does not fight for freedom to secede for the Dutch East Indies, the Polish socialist who does not fight for full freedom and equality for the Jews and the Ukrainians oppressed by the Poles ... is a socialist and an internationalist in name only."
Now, why is Lenin making a distinction between freedom to secede and full freedom and equality? The answer is because Lenin sees the Ukraine, Finland, Tripoli (Libya today), Albania and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia today) as actual or potential nations, whereas the Jews and the Ukrainians are national minorities (nationalities) within a mixed nationality Polish nation. Certainly the Jews of Poland were every bit as much "an historically constituted and distinct community of people" as Conrad's 'British-Irish' and could claim territorial majorities in several parts of Poland (and some Jewish socialists did just that). Moreover, they had a far better claim than Conrad's 'British-Irish' to exercise their right to self determination since they were a long oppressed and persecuted nationality. Yet, in this case Lenin quite rightly stuck to principle. Nationalities have the right to full freedom and equality - exactly what communists should demand for the Protestant Irish within a united Ireland!
Right medicine....? - Wrong time, definitely
In a desperate corner, Conrad states that, "The Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union were constitutionally founded as federations of soviet republics, amongst them was the Don Republic (ie the land of the Cossacks). The Soviet Republic was established as a 'voluntary union of the peoples of Russia' - something for Lenin which 'should fully reassure the Cossacks'. His optimism was not misplaced. The 1st Congress of the Soviets of the Don Republic... 'regarded the Don Republic as part of the RSFSR' and 'declared the working Cossacks' readiness to defend Soviet power'. The Cossacks it should be noted, were a historically established privileged caste who served as the counterrevolutionary terror troops of tsarism. Is there a qualitative difference between the Cossacks and the British Irish? Surely not." (Weekly Worker September 9 1999)
Surely not, indeed! So, let's go through that again. Lenin, writing here in 1918, was no longer writing about the minimum programme, in which, despite his many writings on the nations and nationalities question in the Russian Empire, support for Cossack self-determination never appears once! This may just be something to do with the Cossacks being "the counter-revolutionary terror troops of tsarism." He was writing about the maximum programme, once the working class (and their peasant allies) had taken power. Today's analogy would be that the 'British-Irish' had formed soviets in east Antrim, which were faced with imminent attack by British Unionism and its allies (including possible blessings from the Papacy!). Faced with a scenario, where say, workers in the east Belfast-Ballymena-Larne triangle strike out and establish workers' councils, it would indeed be the duty of Irish communists to encourage these councils to federate in an east Antrim soviet republic "in agreement with the population of the neighbouring zone" and perhaps we should add, in consultation with the local 'Irish-Irish'! But is Conrad seriously asking us to ditch a principled immediate programme for a maximum programme based on fairytales? And some of us thought that Militant's old 'solution' to Orange pogroms - 'Disarm the IRA, Arm Catholic and Protestant trade unionists' - was rather quirky! It is also very tempting to invoke "the ABC of Marxism" once more, when dealing with this muddled confusion of minimum and maximum programme!
But let us look a little closer to what happened to the real, not the paper Don Republic. The new "Soviet regime... attempted to supervise the establishment of Cossack soviets, stressing they did not plan de-cossackisation, ie the ending of separate Cossack identity, and that 'working cossacks' should form their own Soviets... In May-June 1918 the Soviet regime began to form separate Red Cossack military units. This policy succeeded only to a limited extent. The Red Army showed scant respect for the Cossacks in areas they occupied, often requisitioning food without distinguishing 'kulak' from 'working' Cossack and non-Cossacks were enabled to settle old scores. In almost every Cossack area there was an anti-Bolshevik reaction following the initial establishment of Soviet power. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks were able to capitalise on friction between Cossacks and Whites, and in many areas were able to win some Cossacks to their underground organisations. In the summer of 1919, when the Soviet state faced a serious threat from the South, it reiterated its claim that it did not aim at ending a separate status for the Cossacks. But once the Red Army had won back this region, the Soviet state no longer needed to make such concessions... A decree of 25 March 1920 then abolished the separate Cossack Soviets that had been announced in 1918." (The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of the Russian Revolution edited by Harold Shukman) A basic feature of any materialist analysis should be to analyse what people do, rather than be mesmerised by what they say. And by Conrad's "consistent democratic" standards the Bolsheviks fell somewhat short of upholding the principle of "voluntary union" in practice!
Don't keep taking the pills
In the last century, Marx and Engels had to challenge the 'Iron Law of Wages' propounded by German socialist, Ferdinand Lassalle, because of the debilitating effect it could have upon workers struggling for better pay and conditions. Today, we are faced with Conrad's 'Iron Law of Britness'. Already, it has cost his organisation the loss of its entire Scottish membership and a drastic loss of influence amongst socialists in Scotland compared to the early days of the SSA. The CPGB-PCC's refusal to recognise Scotland as a nation, but to opportunistically acknowledge those of a Scottish nationality the right to territorial self-determination, ended up with the CPGB-PCC having the same position in Blair's 1997 Scottish Plebiscite as the racist Scottish Separatist Group. Both recommended stay-at-home abstentionism on the actual day of the ballot. The feature both organisations share in common is that they define Scotland by ethnic criteria. If you are giving the Scottish 'nationality' status instead of giving multi-ethnic Scotland nation status, then logically voting in any referendum should be confined to ethnic Scots - exactly what the Scottish Separatist Group advocated. Of course, if we maintain the difference between ethnic group and multi-ethnic nation, then it is the latter which is entitled to territorial self determination and any ballot should be extended to all registered residents. The CPGB-PCC long remained embarrassedly silent when challenged over this. Furthermore, those they invited into their 'Party' front, the Campaign for Genuine Self Determination, weren't allowed to help determine the campaign slogans. Confused and inconsistent democracy seems to be the hallmark of CPGB-PCC practice.
If the CPGB-PCC accepts Conrad's latest 'therapy' then it will be in danger of 'flirting' with Ulster British reaction. This reactionary force is a lot more dangerous and threatening than the fairly marginal reactionary forces in Scotland at present. As a suggested therapy for addressing the current British-Irish malady, the Conrad Course will be about as effective as leeches for pernicious anaemia. Our recommendation is don't keep taking the (iron) pills!
Allan Armstrong
Republican Communist Network, Scottish Socialist Party
