Weekly Worker 573 Thursday April 21 2005

Going respectable

Liam O Ruairc, a comrade from the Irish republican socialist tradition, looks at Sinn Féin’s evolution under Gerry Adams over the last 20 years

The transition of Sinn Féin from principled revolutionary organisation to opportunist, reformist, constitutional nationalist party has been the subject of many a commentary. The whole process traces its roots to the 1980s. Before the end of that decade, the party was gradually becoming incorporated into the institutions it was supposed to overthrow, mainly through the pressure of electoral considerations and clientelist expectations.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the IRA’s stance regarding constitutional politics was “quite simple and clear-cut ... outside of a 32-county sovereign independent democracy, the IRA will have no involvement in what is loosely called constitutional politics” (‘IRA attitude on elections’ An Phoblacht/Republican News September 5 1981, p20). However, the movement soon introduced the tactic of contesting elections through Sinn Féin. “Who here really believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if with a ballot paper in this hand, and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?” declared Danny Morrison (‘By ballot and bullet’ APRN November 5 1981, p2).

The ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy was born. The purpose of contesting elections and giving an increasingly important role to Sinn Féin was not in order to become some respectable constitutional party, but to introduce a new tactic in the anti-imperialist struggle. The reasons advanced for electoral interventions were, first, that it showed that the national struggle was political, not criminal, in nature. It is difficult to label people as criminal when tens of thousands go out to vote for them. It also refuted the British government’s propaganda that the Republicans were a small isolated group receiving no substantial support.

British strategy also demanded the representation of the nationalist community in the north by constitutional nationalist parties like the Social Democratic and Labour Party and, by challenging its electoral monopoly, Sinn Féin was destabilising the government’s plans (This is made very clear in ‘Revolutionary politics’ APRN April 25 1985, p2. See also ‘Ballots and bombs: electoral tactics complement armed struggle’ APRN February 18 1982, p1). SF portrayed itself as being socially radical and representing the interests of working class people, in contrast to the SDLP’s electoral pool of conservative, middle-aged and middle class voters.

Danny Morrison reassured the movement that tactical electoral intervention would not lead to constitutionalism and reformism: “Sinn Féin will be fighting the elections to consolidate republican support and build a revolutionary organisation which will defend the struggle, not a constitutional party to replace it.” The Provisional movement is not “going sticky”, “there is no parliamentary road to a united Ireland or socialism” and election results “cannot either prejudice the future or the primacy of armed struggle” (Peter Arnlis, ‘The war will go on’ APRN September 16 1982, pp6-7).

This was a fundamental point of principle. In 1984, Martin McGuinness stressed that it was “the combination of the Armalite and the ballot box” that would achieve victory, but made clear which was the weightier of the two: “The Irish Republican Army offers the only resolution to the present situation. It is their disciplined, well directed war against British forces which will eventually bring Britain to withdraw. We know that elections, while important, ... will not achieve a British withdrawal. If Sinn Féin were to win every election it contested, it would still not get an agreement on British withdrawal ... We recognise the value and the limitations of electoral success. We recognise that only disciplined, revolutionary armed struggle by the IRA will end British rule” (‘We will never be slaves again’ APRN June 28 1984, p7).

For his part, Gerry Adams declared that “to think that the British can be ‘talked out’ of Ireland is contemptible” (The politics of revolution: the main speeches and debates from the 1986 Sinn Féin ard-fheis, including the presidential address of Gerry Adams p11) and concluded: “The history of Ireland and of British colonial involvement throughout the world tells us that the British government rarely listens to the force of argument. It understands only the argument of force” (‘There is only one alternative’ APRN February 2 1989, pp8-9). But within a decade Sinn Féin and the IRA had totally abandoned such a stance, and gradually transformed themselves into a constitutional nationalist movement. How did this come about?

The first reason was that the leadership was intent on broadening the base of the movement, and was prepared to pay the price through a dilution of its radical socialist and later republican principles if necessary. It first made clear that the party was not going to be too radical, as this might scare off potential supporters who would be more conservative. When elected president of Sinn Féin in 1983, Gerry Adams declared: “We must be mindful of the dangers of ultra-leftism and remember at all times that, while our struggle has a major social and economic content, the securing of Irish independence is the prerequisite for the advance to a socialist republican society. Therefore ... republicans have a duty to beware of any tendencies which would narrow our demands and our base. This is true not only of forces outside our movement, but also of tendencies within our party” (presidential address APRN November 17 1983, pp8-9).

The next stage was not just avoiding the dangers of being too far on the left - it was about abandoning any pretence of being socialist republican: “The republican struggle should not at this stage of its development style itself ‘socialist republican’. This would imply that there is no place in it for non-socialists” (G Adams The politics of Irish freedom p132). The excuse was that “This inevitably must narrow the potential support base of the republican movement and enable other movements to claim that they are ‘republican’ though they are not socialist: for example, Fianna Fáil or the SDLP” (G Adams Signposts towards independence and socialism Belfast 1988, p13).

Any principled leftwing position, in so far as it would narrow the support base of the movement, had to be rejected. Adams finally admitted in an interview: “I don’t think socialism is on the agenda at all at this stage except for political activists of the left” (Irish Times December 10 1986). The movement’s growth would be weakened if it could not rely on some conservative support.

If Adams understood the dangers of ultra-leftism, he certainly did not understand the dangers of opportunism. The movement’s growth was everything; the principles nothing. And the next target was not socialism, but republicanism itself: “We need to avoid ultra-republican positions” (G Adams Signposts towards independence and socialism Belfast 1988, p16). If the movement’s republicanism was too orthodox, it might not appeal to people who are simply nationalists. Ultimately, Sinn Féin would abandon republicanism all together to maximise the nationalist agenda. Republicanism was gradually diluted into nationalism.

Concerns about widening the base of the movement were closely related with that of widening its electoral support base. If the party wanted to become the majority nationalist party in the north and make considerable electoral progress in the south, it would have to increase its share of the vote, and appeal to people who are neither socialists nor republicans. Adams emphasised that the vote for Sinn Féin from 1982 to 1984 was a “principled republican vote, as opposed to a nationalist or catholic vote ... it is ideologically sound ... We have been stating our case bluntly and dogmatically, we have not been trying to be ‘all things to all men’ and our vote represents the people who came out in support of our position” (‘Steady progress and an injection of reality’ APRN 21 1984, pp2-3).

In a television interview, Adams even went so far as to say that it might be a bad idea to overtake the SDLP electorally, as this might lead to a diminution of social radicalism. But, as the movement gradually transformed itself into a party of votes, it was less and less concerned about what is politically principled. For example, in 1985, SF decided to support women’s right to have abortion - only to reverse that position in 1986. This had less to do with abortion being immoral or wrong than with the opportunistic reason that it would go badly with the southern electorate in general and conservative nationalists in particular, and prevent the party getting more votes.

The objective increasingly became to win the votes of traditional middle class SDLP or Fianna Fáil voters. So a core socialist republican vote became a republican vote and finally a nationalist vote. A very revealing recent example of this was given in a report carried in An Phoblacht of the 2001 Westminster elections in West Tyrone. In the contest between the SDLP and Sinn Féin, there could be no doubt as to how the party represented itself:

“In the past days the enthusiastic reception canvassers have received on doorsteps, including in staunch SDLP strongholds, have confirmed that Doherty’s support has never been so strong … ‘This constituency is overwhelmingly nationalist and it is nothing short of a disgrace that a unionist politician opposed to the peace process was elected last time,’ says Pat Doherty. ‘Now is the time for the nationalist people of West Tyrone to rally around a party and a politician who will lead from the front to strengthen the peace process and effectively represent all the people of this constituency on the issues that matter the most, which include inward investment, transport infrastructure and demilitarisation.’ … Sinn Féin is seen … as the only nationalist party committed to negotiating further concessions on issues like policing and demilitarisation. But beyond the figures and the short-term considerations, the battle in West Tyrone is also a symbol of the direction nationalism is taking and the future of the Six Counties … The rise of Sinn Féin across the Six Counties will further confirm a trend of recent elections: Sinn Féin is the fastest growing party on the island and is becoming the largest nationalist party in the north” (my emphasis - ‘Pat Doherty to win West Tyrone’ APRN June 1 2001, p6).

From once opposing the ‘collaborationist’ and middle class SDLP, Sinn Féin now tries to replace the constitutional nationalist party and appeal to middle class and conservative voters.

Another reason for Sinn Féin’s evolution is that from the second half of the 1980s onward, central to the Provisionals’ strategy was the building of ‘broad fronts’. But the question is, on what political basis is the front built, who qualifies and how broad should it be? According to Adams, “We have to proceed on the basis of the lowest common denominator and at the level of people’s understanding” (G Adams Signposts towards independence and socialism Belfast 1988, p16). This means building fronts on so broad a basis that they can encompass everything from the catholic church to corporate Irish America.
In practice, the Provisionals sought to accommodate and build a ‘pan-nationalist alliance’ with Fianna Fáil, the catholic church - and the SDLP, instead of confronting them, as in the past: “Rather than denouncing the party, republicans should take a constructive approach with the SDLP” (‘Broadening the base’ APRN June 30 1988, p3). This could only but seriously weaken republicanism’s anti-partitionist thrust, as those elements have always been much more hostile to the IRA than to British involvement in Ireland.

When Sinn Féin did succeed in building such alliances, it was not on its own terms. It is not the Dublin government, the SDLP and the Clinton/Bush administration that have come to the republican position, but rather the Provisional movement which has moved to the constitutional nationalist position.

The price of the inclusion of republicans in the pan-nationalist alliance was the exclusion of republicanism. Sinn Féin has allowed those conservative elements to lead the whole nationalist struggle. Constitutional nationalism is the emphasis upon unity by consent, and republicanism has become subsumed within a partitionist nationalist project. The people who have always sold the struggle out are the people Sinn Féin was now relying on. Their aim was to effectively decommission republicanism, and they succeeded. The price of meetings with Clinton or Bush in the White House or of joint initiatives with the leadership of Fianna Fáil were ceasefires, unilateral acts of decommissioning and defeat.

When elected president of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams expressed his support for the armed struggle of the IRA: “Armed struggle is a necessary and morally correct form of resistance in the Six Counties against a government whose presence is rejected by the vast majority of Irish people ... There are those who tell us that the British government will not be moved by armed struggle. As has been said before, the history of Ireland and of British colonial involvement throughout the word tells us that they will not be moved by anything else” (presidential address APRN November 17 1983, pp8-9).

But electoralism was soon to take its toll on Sinn Féin’s commitment to support the primacy of armed struggle. In 1985, all Sinn Féin local election candidates had to sign a republican declaration giving unequivocal support to armed struggle. But after the British government introduced legislation making compulsory for anyone standing to reject proscribed organisations or illegal activities, the 1989 Sinn Féin ard fheis authorised councillors to sign up to this ‘anti-violence’ declaration. So, when it comes to a choice between votes and expressing support for the armed struggle of the IRA, the party chose electoralism. Sinn Féin had thus repudiated the Armalite in favour of the ballot box long before it signed up to the Mitchell principles.

In the meantime, SF faced the contradictions of ‘going into the state to overthrow the state’. In 1985, it decided that its elected representatives in the north would take their seats on local councils. An editorial in An Phoblacht promised: “Within the councils of the Six Counties, Sinn Féin elected representatives will challenge the basis of the state itself and that is why they are seen as a threat both by the loyalists and by the so-called ‘constitutional nationalists’” (‘No illusions’ APRN May 2 1985, p1). In theory, the republican objective was to overthrow the northern state. That was what the IRA armed struggle was about. But, while the IRA was bombing and destroying City Hall as a symbol of the state, Sinn Féin councillor were de facto accepting the state and trying to make it work by using it as a source of income, funding community initiatives, investment for social development projects, etc. Rather than providing an alternative structure to the state, as Adams had earlier envisaged in his jail writings, Sinn Féin was now susceptible to cooption by the state.

A few years later, it was evident that Sinn Féin’s attitude towards the state had evolved: “As one Sinn Féin councillor observed, ‘The loyalists and the council officials were genuinely apprehensive of Sinn Féin in the council chamber, but within a short period of time they saw that we were genuine and reasonable” (‘Advancing under attack - Sinn Féin in the council chambers’ APRN March 2 1989, pp8-9). The reason was that, for the purpose of running city councils, there were practically no differences between Sinn Féin and the other constitutionalist parties. Mairtin O Muilleor, a well known Belfast Sinn Féin councillor, admitted that, “When it comes to ‘bins, bodies and bogs’ (the normal issues at council meetings), we are only a few degrees to the left of the SDLP” (‘Broadening the base’ APRN June 30 1988, p3).

Brendan O Brien, the security correspondent for RTE who cannot be suspected of republican or leftwing sympathies, was one of the first who recognised the significance of this process: “In the 1970s, abstentionist republicans would never have considered ‘recognising’ Belfast City Hall. It was the bastion of unionism and of the British state. The republican movement would have none of it. They would insist on abstaining from the state until Britain was forced out through the IRA campaign ... By 1993 Sinn Féin had 10 seats at Belfast City Hall and were looking ahead to a nationalist majority on the council. They were claiming it as their own, despite the union jack flying overhead and all the symbols of unionism and empire inside. This would have far-reaching implications for a movement which regarded itself not just as republican but revolutionary. They were joining the system, not tearing it down” (B O Brien The long war Dublin 1999, pp47-49).

Sinn Féin had de facto accepted the legitimacy of the state years before it signed up to the Belfast agreement. Unionist dominance of Belfast city council ended with the local government elections of 1997. The first Sinn Féin lord mayor of Belfast to be appointed was Alex Maskey for the year 2002-03. Photographs of him sitting with a union jack in his parlour and proudly wearing his mayor necklace would have been unthinkable two decades ago and symbolised how far Sinn Féin had accepted the institutions it was once pledged to overthrow (see B McCaffrey and A Maskey Man and mayor Belfast 2003).

This was also true of the recognition of the legitimacy of the southern parliament. The republican movement traditionally considered itself to be the legitimate government of Ireland, and the IRA the sole legitimate army. When elected as president of Sinn Féin, Adams stated: “On the question of Leinster House, we are an abstentionist party. It is not my intention to advocate a change in this situation.” He promised the delegates that he was not “about to lead you into Leinster House” (presidential address APRN November 17 1983, pp8-9).

The problem is that, once the legitimacy of the Dublin government is recognised, there cannot be two legitimate governments and two legitimate armies; one has to recognise that the official Irish army is the only legitimate army and that an illegal army is therefore illegitimate. The republican objective is to bring down Leinster House, not enter it. However, in 1986, in order to grow electorally in the south, the Provisionals dropped abstentionism and recognised its legitimacy.

Denying that the current leadership “are intent on edging the republican movement on to a constitutional path”, Martin McGuinness then declared: “I can give a commitment on behalf of the leadership that we have absolutely no intention of going to Westminster or Stormont ... Our position is clear and it will never, never, never change. The war against British rule must continue until freedom is achieved ... We will lead you to the republic” (The politics of revolution - the main speeches and debates from the 1986 Sinn Féin ard fheis, including the presidential address of Gerry Adams pp26-27).

Eight years later, the ‘war against British rule’ was over, and five years after that Martin McGuinness was a British minister of education in the Stormont assembly …

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