Weekly Worker 577 Thursday May 19 2005

Ideologically wrong, tactically stupid

Liam O Ruairc, a comrade from the Irish republican socialist tradition, continues his examination of the embrace of constitutional nationalism by Sinn Féin and the IRA

On August 1989, on the 20th anniversary of the arrival of British troops, a spokesperson for the army council of the Irish Republican Army stated: “The IRA strategy is very clear. At some point in the future due to the pressure of the continuing and sustained armed struggle, the will of the British government to remain in this country will be broken. That is the objective of the armed struggle...we can state confidently today that there will be no ceasefire and no truces until Britain declares its intent to withdraw and leave our people in peace” (IRA statement: ‘We will break Britain’s will’ An Phoblacht/Republican News August 17 1989).

For its part, the IRA’s political wing declared a year earlier: “Sinn Féin is totally opposed to a power-sharing Stormont assembly and states that there cannot be a partitionist solution. Stormont is not a stepping stone to Irish unity” (SF-SDLP talks p6). However, within five years the IRA was to call a ceasefire short of a British declaration of intent to withdraw, and 10 years later Sinn Féin would be sitting in a power-sharing assembly in Stormont. The Provisional movement now saw the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy as outdated and replaced it by a ‘ballot box and solution’ one (a ballot paper in one hand and a solution in the other: see APRN April 2 1992). This was the result of the shift from a ‘long war’ strategy to a ‘peace process’. The ‘peace process’ was essentially a Republican retreat disguised as some new ‘strategic initiative’.

The 1992 IRA new year statement contained a demand to end the conflict: “Our ability to diversify and to strike effectively and hard has driven home the message that Britain is fast running out of options and must soon face the inevitable by taking the steps necessary to resolve this conflict and grant peace and stability to the people of Ireland.” The British government knew that the IRA could continue its struggle but was in fact interested in ending the conflict: “We for our part genuinely desire peace; the British have it in their power to grant peace.” If so, the IRA stated that it was ready to “show the leadership and courage required of us” (‘Britain fast running out of options’ APRN January 2 1992).

The shift is clearly noticeable when we compare this with the 1984 message: “This war is to the end. There will be no interval ... When we put away our guns, Britain will be out of Ireland and an Irish democracy will be established in the 32 counties with a national government” (APRN January 5 1984). Later in 1993 an IRA representative stated: “Those who have the power to resolve this conflict will find republicans are people they can do business with” (IRA statement: ‘The conflict can be resolved’ APRN April 15 1993). And in early 1994, it was made clear how pragmatic the IRA was prepared to be: “We are prepare to be flexible in exploring the potential for peace. All concerned should leave no stone unturned” (IRA statement: ‘We remain positive and flexible’ APRN March 16 1994).

The central question that has to be raised is whether the movement went too far, and showed itself too flexible and conciliatory to explore this potential for peace and negotiations.

If the theme of ‘peace’ and the possibility of a cessation were not something new, in the early 1990s there were new elements - qualitative developments within the political thinking of the Provisional movement which revealed a downgrading of their political agenda:

• The emphasis was no longer on the traditional objective of a British government declaration of intent to withdraw, but upon its recognition that “the Irish people as a whole have a right to self-determination” (Sinn Féin Towards a lasting peace Dublin and Belfast, 1992). While in appearance being in continuity with traditional republican demands, the concept represented a shift in position, because self-determination allows for a degree of ambiguity around the means of exercising that right. For example, this means that if a majority of people in Ireland as a whole decide that there will be no united Ireland until a majority of people in the north agree, that constitutes national self-determination rather than a partitionist compromise.
  
• Consequently, the Provisional movement now stated that the exercise of self-determination is a matter for agreement between the people of Ireland. This signalled a profound change. The April 23 1993 Hume-Adams statement contained the following two crucial sentences: “The exercise of self-determination is a matter for agreement between the people of Ireland. It is the search for that agreement and the means of achieving it on which we will be concentrating” (joint statement from Gerry Adams and John Hume APRN September 30 1993). Never before had the republican movement stated publicly that there had to be agreement on the exercise of self-determination. That meant that any accommodation had to be based on terms acceptable to the unionist community. It meant that the unionist community had a veto over whatever was to happen. In other words, it was the unionist veto rewritten.
  
• The Provisional movement now recognised that the consent and allegiance of unionists are essential if a lasting peace is to be established. While still arguing that the unionist veto must go, it was “seeking to obtain the consent of a majority of people in the north” (Towards a lasting peace p12). However, the difficulty with this is that the unionist right to consent is precisely what republicans have always claimed constituted that veto: unity by consent of the majority of the north of Ireland was nothing more than a partitionist fudge.
  
• The Provisional movement revised its analysis of the British presence. Rather than being called ‘imperialist’, the British government was now actually given a neutral, if not a positive role by “joining the ranks of the persuaders” and convincing the unionists that their future lies in a united Ireland (ibid). However, the British state’s main strategic objective has always been to render ineffectual the military capacity of the IRA to effect political change, not convincing the unionists to accept it.
  
• The Dublin and London governments, as well as the ‘international community’, are given a major responsibility to secure political progress and establish inclusive negotiations, excluding no section of the Irish people (namely Sinn Féin voters), leading to a negotiated settlement and a lasting peace.

Parallel to this, the objective of a 32-county socialist republic was given a very ‘ultimate’ nature. An important departure from previous positions was that the Provisionals now stated: “The British government’s departure must be preceded by a sustained period of peace and will arise out of negotiations” (‘It is our job to develop the struggle for freedom’ - Bodenstown address APRN June 25 1992).

In 1993, Martin McGuinness signalled this major compromise on the objective of ‘Brits out’ when at Bodenstown, he spoke about “interim arrangements”, implying that armed struggle might end short of British withdrawal (‘There will be no turning back’ APRN June 24 June). Those interim arrangements would provide a transition (duration unspecified) into the ultimate objective. The Provisionals no longer had any specific timetable for British withdrawal.

Later, in early 1995, Gerry Adams spoke of a “transitional phase” in which there must be “maximum democracy”, “equality of treatment” and “parity of esteem” (‘Peace means justice - justice demands freedom’ APRN March 2 1995). Those statements signalled that the Provisional leadership would inevitably attempt to sell any future political agreement as transitional, while ignoring the absence of any concrete transitional mechanisms for democratic political change, thus representing a de facto recognition of British rule in Ireland.

The Provisional movement’s political and ideological shift can be attributed to the constraints of ‘pan-nationalism’ - or ‘nationalist consensus’, as the Provisionals preferred calling it. Central to the new strategy was the idea that the pan-nationalist alliance of the Irish government, Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party could pressurise the British government in a diplomatic offensive to ‘persuade’ the unionists that their interest was in a united Ireland. The Provisionals spent a long time in the early 1990s building that pan-nationalist coalition through secret talks with Fianna Fáil, and in particular the Hume-Adams initiatives of 1993.

The pan-nationalist coalition was the logical conclusion to the ‘broad front’ strategy of the 1980s. When the Provisional movement finally succeeded in building an alliance with those other political forces, it was not on its own terms: for this ‘national consensus’ to be possible, it had to accept considerable sections of the SDLP and Fianna Fáil’s constitutional nationalist agenda, not least because the concepts of ‘national self-determination’ and its ‘exercise’ provided the basis on which the alliance was built. Sinn Féin admitted as early as 1988 that the concept of ‘national self-determination’ represented the best bridge towards constitutional nationalism, as it was of a sufficiently universal character for wide sections of nationalism, including the SDLP and Fianna Fáil to regard it as a “shared political view” and a potentially common framework for “the broadest possible alliance” to develop a “strategy to establish peace and justice in Ireland” (Sinn Féin statement: ‘At conclusion of Sinn Féin-SDLP talks’ APRN September 8 1988).

Thus it is not the Dublin government and the SDLP that had come to the republican position, but rather the Provisional movement which had moved to the constitutional nationalist position that Irish self-determination would have to be achieved with the consent of the people of the north. Republicanism had become subsumed within a partitionist nationalist project. The price of the inclusion of republicans in the pan-nationalist alliance was the exclusion of republicanism.

By relying on elements who had always been much more hostile to the IRA than to British involvement in Ireland, the Provisional movement’s anti-partitionist thrust could only be seriously weakened. In seeking an alliance with parties that accept the unionist veto as the foundation of any political settlement, the Adams leadership was implicitly acknowledging that any future political arrangement would be a predominantly internal one, leaving the constitutional status of the Six Counties unaltered.
In the early 1990s, the Provisional leadership engaged in secret talks with the British government.
This, as well as other positive signals from the British, led the Provisionals to believe that at some point London and Dublin had agreed that the old policy of excluding republicans was futile and that the only strategic alternative was one of inclusion in dialogue and negotiations. What goes unmentioned is that “the strategic objective was to include republicans while excluding republicanism” (Anthony McIntyre, ‘Why Stormont reminded me of Animal Farm’, Sunday Tribune April 12 1998). The price to be paid for the inclusion of republicans in the talks was the exclusion of republicanism.

This means dialogue with republican leaders and organisations, but on the basis of an agenda that excludes the political objectives of republicanism. Central to the political objectives of republicanism were that there would be no internal settlement (a settlement internal to Northern Ireland), that the political connection with Britain must be severed, that partition should go and therefore Ireland reunite. The whole peace process may have included republicans, but from the 1993 Downing Street declaration to the final 1998 Belfast agreement, it was always based on the British state’s political alternative to republicanism since 1972: an internal solution (a power-sharing assembly in the north which includes nationalists) with the externality of an Irish dimension (cross-border bodies) grafted on it.

The longstanding Provisional demands were never serious runners for all-party talks. And none of them appeared in the final Belfast agreement: “What the British were allowing republicans - by permitting them into all-party talks, where they can argue for a united Ireland without the remotest possibility of securing it - is an opportunity to dig a tunnel to the moon” (Anthony McIntyre, ‘Sinn Féin stance hinders republican cause’ Sunday Tribune July 20 1997).

The SDLP and Fianna Fáil were only prepared to work with the Provisional leadership if the IRA called a cessation of operations, and the British government made it clear that it would be ready to include Sinn Féin in negotiations if Provisional IRA weapon were silent. So on August 31 1994, the IRA declared a cessation: “Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann have decided that, as of midnight, Wednesday August 31, there will be a complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly ... We believe that an opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement has been created ... A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations ... It is our desire to significantly contribute to the creation of a climate which will encourage this” (‘Seize the moment for peace’ APRN September 1 1994).

For the Adams leadership, preserving the unity of the movement was crucial. It had to avoid at all costs elements sceptical of the peace strategy splitting away. The message given internally was that the Provisional movement was in a ‘win-win’ situation: either the movement’s objectives could be won through the ‘unarmed strategy’ or it could go back to war. However, the problem was that the Provisional movement would find itself in a situation in which it could neither win its objectives through the unarmed strategy nor go back to war and its traditional political agenda.

The 1994 IRA ceasefire lasted until February 1996 and broke down because of a growing number of preconditions to inclusive negotiations which were unacceptable to the Provisional movement. First, the British government did not allow Sinn Féin to enter into political negotiations until the Provisionals declared their ceasefire to be permanent. Then in March 1995, Patrick Mayhew, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland, set out in a speech in Washington that in order to enter into political talks, the IRA would first have to ‘decommission’ (disarm) its weaponry. This was absolutely rejected by the IRA, which stated that there would be no decommissioning through the front door or the back door.

Finally, in January 1996, senator George Mitchell published his ‘six principles’, which sought to establish the entry requirements to political negotiations and define the nature of all future political activity. The principles included renouncing the use of force and a commitment to exclusively peaceful means to resolve political issues, as well as the total disarmament of paramilitary organisations, verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission. The IRA executive put forward the opinion that an acceptance of the principles would constitute a blatant violation of the IRA constitution, as they challenged the IRA’s right to bear arms and implied an acceptance of the unionist veto. Due to all those preconditions to “inclusive negotiations”, the IRA felt that the peace strategy could not move forward and that it had no options but to end its ceasefire.

However, this was not the end of the peace strategy. The IRA stated that it saw the necessity for armed struggle not because it is necessary to force a British declaration of intent to withdraw, but “because, given current political conditions, there is not the necessary dynamic to move us all away from conflict and towards a lasting peace on the basis of a viable process which by its nature ensures that the core issues at the heart of the conflict are addressed and resolved” (‘IRA needs “viable process”’ APRN March 7 1996).

In other words, the IRA campaign was to generate pressure for all-party talks and inclusive negotiations. The Provisional movement had invested too much and had gone too far in the peace process to do a U-turn at this stage. On top of that, the disastrous nature of the 1996-97 campaign showed that it was difficult to go back to war. The movement had not prepared a ‘plan B’ and thus was stuck in the process. The worst was that the movement had paid a very high price to be included in a process which brought it few benefits.

In the British general election of May 1997, Tony Blair and the Labour Party secured a landslide victory, while the next month a Fianna Fáil-PD coalition was returned to power in Leinster House. In both elections, Sinn Féin’s vote increased. In this new political context, the US and Dublin governments’ agreed to fixed dates for the commencement and conclusion of all-party talks, to which Sinn Féin could be admitted without prior IRA decommissioning, and the IRA reinstated its ceasefire in July 1997. In September 1997, Sinn Féin endorsed the Mitchell principles and entered political negotiations.

By that time, the political parameters had been set and any future political arrangement would be a predominantly internal one. The publication of the ‘framework document’ in February 1995 envisaged the establishment of power-sharing in Stormont, along with the establishment of minimalist cross-border bodies.

From a republican standpoint, rejection of the framework document (like the Downing Street declaration) should have been immediate. But the Provisional leadership did not reject it. Already back in 1993-94 it had not immediately rejected the Downing Street declaration, as it did with Sunningdale in 1973 or the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and instead asked for ‘clarifications’. After the 1997 ceasefire, the Provisionals downgraded the republican political agenda to the point where it was possible for Gerry Adams not to mention British withdrawal, but instead “renegotiate the union” (‘Another chance for progress’ APRN July 24 1997 and Irish News July 17 1997). In January 1998 the London and Dublin governments published the ‘heads of agreement’ paper, which provided the blueprint for the subsequent Belfast agreement.

To conclude, one can only agree with Bernadette Devlin-McAliskey that the whole 1990s peace process was “ideologically wrong, as well as strategically and tactically stupid”. Its central purpose was to “demobilise, demilitarise and demoralise the republican people of Ireland - and it has done all three” (http://rwg.phoblacht.net/bernadette.html).

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