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Weekly Worker 579 Thursday June 2 2005
No sellout on self-determination
Left criticism of Sinn Féin is too one-sided, contends Sean MacGabhain
The discussion carried in the Weekly Worker on Sinn Féin and the
Irish peace process is reminiscent of those that have been going on in
the British left since the 1970s. The nature of self-determination and
its implication for Ireland have featured as part of the discussion. Liam
O Ruairc and Philip Ferguson have also commented on what they see as the
rightward drift of Sinn Féin.
As the discussion in Britain is driven by action in Ireland, I would like
to take up some of their observations and include some thoughts on self-determination.
Liam O Ruairc has not demonstrated that Sinn Féin accepts a unionist
veto on Irish unity - a denial of the Irish right to self-determination.
The quotations he cites are clear about the exercise of self-determination
being a matter of agreement by the Irish people themselves, without the
exercise of British sovereignty.
That does not admit of a right of Britain to rule Ireland and it does
not concede that the Good Friday agreement or the separate referenda which
endorsed it were an exercise of self-determination. What it does admit
is the reality that unionists in the north of Ireland constitute a defined
minority (leaving aside the question as to whether they are a national
minority) and that an autonomous state in Ireland requires agreement as
to the form and shape of political structures. These will take into account
the continued existence of a considerable body of people who may claim
a collective British identity, even in the absence of British
sovereignty. Despite the absence of logic in this claim (even the name
of the state, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
denies the Britishness of NI), a demand to recognise its existence
should be respected.
The British state agrees that the Irish people as a whole (which includes
the population of the Six Counties) have a right of self-determination
and concede a right of one part of the UK, the Six Counties of Northern
Ireland, to secede - but only on the basis that Northern Ireland forms
part of a united Ireland. The Six Counties itself does not have a right
of self-determination - quite properly so. Britain conceded these formulas
in order to provide a framework for the 1994 IRA ceasefire. The Irish
government conceded that the exercise of the right of self-determination
in Ireland could only be triggered by agreement of a majority in the Six
Counties to leave the UK - a clear contradiction in terms, since it concedes
the right of a foreign power to exercise sovereignty in Ireland. The Dublin
government attempted to claim that the separate Good Friday referenda
were an exercise in self-determination - another exercise in sophistry.
The above may seem unnecessarily formulaic. However, it can form the basis
of an analysis of what has transpired since the IRA cessation of 1994.
Unionism in the north of Ireland has been given a veto by the British
state over a change in the status of Northern Ireland, for as long as
it remains a majority. But unionism does not have a right to rule as a
majority, because that rule is institutionally sectarian. That reality,
and a bevy of equality and other legislation, is a gain of the nationalist
uprising since 1968, one that is unlikely to be reversed without mass
revolt. It is a denial of unionisms right to rule according to the
norms of bourgeois democracy. This can be defended given the record of
the Six Counties state and the fact that it was set up as a purely sectarian
bulwark that became a byword for discrimination. It was also set up to
divide republican forces and to thwart the exercise of independence and
democracy in Ireland.
Breaking sectarian rule is inherently destabilising of the Six Counties
state. The fanaticising of sections of the unionist population, including
large sections of the working class, is dependent on the ability to impose
sectarian rule. The imposition of governmental structures that include
republicans undermines unionist hegemony and, together with the use of
cross-border structures, can cause a break-up in the unionist all-class
alliance and its monolithic political structures. That is why former Unionist
Party leader James Molyneux correctly saw the agreement as a bigger threat
to the union than the IRA campaign, and why he has effectively switched
to support for Ian Paisleys Democratic Unionist Party.
However, the British government conceded on the form of power-sharing
in the north, but not its substance. Unionism, in the form of David Trimbles
Unionist Party, was given an offer it could not refuse, and was effectively
forced to sign the Good Friday agreement. But unionism has been free to
frustrate the agreement ever since, by refusing to become part of the
governmental structures. The two governments have acquiesced in this for
their own reasons.
Britain, despite appearances to the contrary, maintains a capacity and
a willingness to pursue imperialist interests in Ireland by keeping it
divided. The southern government is determined to maintain the stability
of the Republic of Ireland 26-county state at all costs - again despite
appearances to the contrary. They require stability in the Six Counties,
which entails reluctance to confront the sectarian refusal of unionism
to share power with republicans (in fact with the majority of nationalists).
Dublin does not relish a break-up of the Six Counties state as a result
of the operation of the Good Friday agreement. Hence the ideological onslaught
on republicanism over the past period, that has included the main political
parties and the media, and that plays down the establishment of a unionist
realignment based on the ability to successfully say no to
reform.
The clear way out of the impasse is pursuit of the logic of the end of
majority rule by extending power-sharing to all local government structures
initially and a threat to legislate for all-Ireland economic integration
if unionist refusal continues.
That has not happened. Instead Sinn Féin has faced an onslaught
reminiscent of the worst days of bourgeois propaganda during the period
of armed struggle. Everything has been done to shift the public gaze away
from the successful reassertion of sectarian policy and its toleration
and encouragement by the two governments. If Sinn Féin was playing
the role of integration into the bourgeois order in Ireland, this would
not be happening.
Again, it may be asked, what is the relevance of this description of political
events to the contributions of Ferguson and O Ruairc? It is because they
start their analysis with their disappointment with Sinn Féin and
seek to blame Sinn Féin for the political impasse in Ireland. It
is a mirror image of the rightwing critique, though from a leftwing and
republican angle. The sentiments are genuine, but they are one-sided.
Sinn Féin has almost complete political hegemony over the nationalist
working class, despite continuing and strenuous efforts by imperialism
and its allies. Leftwing detractors make the mistake of focusing on Sinn
Féin rather than on imperialism. In fact some republican
commentators have entered into a de facto alliance with the pro-imperialist
media in order to try to undermine the ideological dominance of Sinn Féin.
I do not include either O Ruairc or Ferguson in that. However, they provide
no independent political trajectory that can both defend the rights of
Sinn Féin against imperialist onslaught and propose initiatives
that move beyond the current impasse.
Many on the left are minor but critical cheerleaders of the
right when it comes to criticism of Sinn Féin - I include the Irish
Socialist Workers Party in this. But they are not the only ones. Many
left republicans seem destined to a life of commentary or sectarian political
harangue, which seems to doom them to political insignificance, interspersed
with momentary promotion by media outlets (in need of an extra dimension
to a staple diet of anti-Sinn Féin propaganda). Again, I exclude
O Ruairc and Ferguson from this observation.
Ferguson recognises some objective factors affecting Sinn Féins
political evolution, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union both materially
and ideologically. That event had a pretty big worldwide impact. What
he fails to integrate is a balance sheet that might see that his leftwing
trajectory for Sinn Féin was formulaic. He is in danger of reducing
the causes of his political disappointment to the machinations of Machiavellian
forces. Defeat in politics depends not only on the strengths of the victor,
but also the weaknesses of the loser, and objective circumstances.
A capacity to always see the glass as half empty is also a perennial problem
on the left. The opportunities for political intervention in Ireland are
open on a number of fronts, as long as militants stop seeing Sinn Féin
as the enemy. Political opponents they may be, but not an organisation
on the wrong side of the divide. Leftwing republicans should actively
and enthusiastically call for a vote for Sinn Féin, where they
feel unable to mount a credible challenge of their own.
A critique of Sinn Féin would have more chance of success if it
was based on an understanding of the role played by the organisation in
pushing the struggle forward. Sinn Féin will stop being able to
do that if it is successfully marginalised and isolated. Is that what
the leftwing critics want or are they so drawn by the trajectory of revolutionary
despair that they are effectively politically paralysed? There appears
to be an atmosphere of anticipated Schadenfreude if Sinn Féin is
defeated by the combined onslaught of Dublin and London. Is there a pipe
dream that they can step into the vacuum?
However, if Sinn Féin can be influenced by the considerable apparatus
of imperialism to accept reform, then why not also by a popular mobilisation
from the base to stand firm? Because there is no effective counterweight
within the nationalist community. The problem is that left
republicans appear to be affected by a collective fit of pique that results
in hectoring observations about tactical stupidity from political
actors so isolated by their abstention from politics that criticism is
dispensed in the form of middle class disdain.
Instead, tactical alliances should be made with Sinn Féin in opposition
to the attacks on nationalist rights.
The first should be in opposition to the refusal to operate the governmental
arrangements under the Good Friday agreement. It should include an ideological
onslaught on unionism and imperialism in every sector of society that
seeks to draw out anti-sectarian elements from within the protestant population
and to expose the sectarian nature of unionist politics. The attacks on
Sinn Féins and the nationalist populations democratic
mandate in the form of financial penalties or a refusal to start up the
governmental structures should be denounced as attacks on basic democratic
rights.
The basis for making leftwing republicanism a poll of attraction is by
starting with a defence of democratic rights. After all, that is the basis
of the national question - an assertion of the democratic right of the
Irish people as a whole to unity and independence. Making leftwing politics
relevant means demonstrating that working class action is the best defence
of the rights of the oppressed - in this case the rights of the Irish
people to self-determination. The pipe dream of resuming armed struggle
in the current context is, I am assuming, excluded. An understanding that
the 26-county state represents a partial victory as well as partial defeat
of the attempt to free Ireland is, to some extent, also assumed. The achievements
of part of the Irish people, albeit within the confines of bourgeois democracy
and through a rejection of ideological control by Roman catholic social
teaching, represents a proof of the correctness of the demand for separation
from Britain. In other words, it is not necessary to go back to the drawing
board and reinvent the socialist or anti-imperialist wheel in Ireland.
Such an approach as I have sketchily outlined has the capacity to build
political experience and to develop a broader anti-imperialist constituency
in Ireland. It would also help to bring politics back to the grassroots.
To embark on this path, the first thing that has to be recognised is that
the politics of the Good Friday agreement can stabilise partition only
if the agreement itself is neutered. The agreement is a gain for the anti-imperialist
struggle. Political action can sustain it and can help expose contradictions
inherent in British rule in the Six Counties. Political action is what
is missing.
Criticism can only go so far. In the end it becomes addictive and corrosive,
when not combined with the test of political action.
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