Weekly Worker 680 Thursday July 5 2007 Subscribe to the Weekly Worker

What is the route to principled unity?

Phil Sharpe of the Democratic Socialist Alliance replies to Peter Manson (‘Unity and opportunism’ Weekly Worker June 28)

The article by Peter Manson argues that I have misrepresented the CPGB’s conception of how to bring about revolutionary unity. Peter states that what is not being suggested is unity with the SWP as it is presently constituted.

Instead a political process of transformation, such as the adoption of revolutionary principles and open democratic centralism, will be necessary if the unification process is to be realised: “In other words, the revolutionary left must totally transform itself through the adoption of genuine democratic centralism and the rejection of short-cut-to-nowhere opportunism.”

This argument does not answer the point I was making about how to get from A to B in the present and immediate future. In what concrete sense can the CMP grow in relation to the situation we are in? Hence, Peter does not address the issue that we are presently in a situation where the opportunism of the SWP, and to a lesser extent the SP, is dominant, and the forces of what could be a united revolutionary Marxism are divided and fragmented into many competing groups.

Instead of addressing this issue, Peter is more concerned to argue in a negative sense that the CPGB has acted in a principled manner in the Socialist Alliance and Respect, and this shows that they are not in the business of trying to conciliate people like John Rees and the SWP. If I was to concede that this is the history of the relationship of the CPGB to the SWP, it proves nothing more than the CPGB is not in the business of conciliating the SWP as presently constituted.

However, there is still another important political problem that Peter has not addressed. Namely, to the CPGB, the question of how to realise so-called Marxist unity is dependent upon what happens within the SWP. To Peter, the question of what would represent the realisation of a principled Marxist party is dependent upon what happens within the SWP and the SP: “Our call for a single party of the revolutionary left is not about appeasing John Rees and Peter Taaffe, but is in the first place directed at their members.”

In other words, the central concern becomes what happens within the SWP, and as a result we neglect, or even downgrade, the issue of how we construct relations with the rest of the left. This is because the strategy of what represents revolutionary unity is conceived as not being possible without the SWP, and therefore our tactics become rigid because what is being proposed is the central and timeless importance of rebellion within the ranks of the SWP. But the objective result of this standpoint, whatever may be the stated intentions of the CPGB, is to conciliate the SWP, because the SWP is conceived as the axis around which everything turns.

This means that the CPGB do effectively gloss over the extent and the effect of the opportunist degeneration of the SWP, in order to argue that the SWP could potentially constitute the basis of a hypothetical and future revolutionary unity. So, whilst the CPGB is critical of the organisational and political role of Respect, they also fudge what this means in terms of theoretical degeneration. For example, Peter implies that the SWP’s understanding of globalisation is not problematic, or at least as worthy as that undertaken by the Permanent Revolution group.

He goes on to argue: “In fact there are many spheres where SWP writers have made worthwhile contributions. Yet comrade Sharpe does not advocate rapprochement with the SWP.” This is like saying that because Kautsky was an important theoretician we should ignore his vitriolic hatred of the October revolution and the connected conciliation of the right wing of social democracy. Someone like Alex Callinicos can be put in the same category as Kautsky, as I will now try to explain.

Callinicos has written many books on philosophy and history that represent an important contribution to Marxism. His Making history (Polity Press, 1987) is an outstanding reply to Gerry Cohen’s functionalist interpretation of the Marxist conception of historical development. However, as a sophisticated apologist of the SWP, Callinicos has helped to pioneer their present reformist turn. His Anti-capitalist manifesto (Polity Press, 2004) argues that because globalisation is no more than the expression of the policy of the so-called neoliberal offensive, the effects of this policy can be reversed by the implementation of what would effectively be the realisation of a welfare state-type capitalism.

In this context, the demands he raises are not revolutionary, and certainly do not express the aim of the self-emancipation of labour. Instead they are about how we can put pressure on the ruling class to reject its existing policies. This reformist stance is precisely an expression of the theoretical rejection of the importance of globalisation as the structural context of capital accumulation. Such a flawed interpretation of globalisation is the theoretical basis to affirm and support a reformist type of practice.

This was shown in relation to the approach of the Stop the War movement, which was about putting pressure on the ruling class, rather than representing the strategic necessity to oppose the power of global capital. Consequently, the question of how we understand globalisation is not an abstract question without any practical questions. Instead it is a concrete issue that shows the intimate relationship between theory and practice.

In other words, what could be called the ontology of the SWP, or how they conceive of reality and its most important causal principles, has important implications for the relationship between theory and practice. This point can be historically confirmed.

On the one hand, Kautsky considered that the rivalry between national-based monopoly capital was being superseded by a process he called ultra-imperialism. Consequently, the tactical implications of this ontological understanding was to appeal to the capitalists for peace, as the alternative to what was considered to be anachronistic militarism, and the related rejection of a revolutionary approach.

On the other hand, Lenin argued that the structural importance of rival national monopoly capital meant that inter-imperialist conflict and world war had become an inherent aspect of capitalist development. The strategic implication of this alternative analysis was to argue for a strategy of international proletarian revolution, and the tactic of revolutionary defeatism.

Different conceptions of capitalism explained vastly contrasting strategies, and specifically explained why the centrism of Kautsky was on a rightwing trajectory towards definitive degeneration into reformism. The strategic implications of Kautsky’s approach was to struggle to improve the democratic aspects of the existing nation-state, because militarism could be overthrown within the context of the economic logic of capitalist development. This suggested reformist tactics of putting pressure on the existing state, and a strategy of improving bourgeois democracy as the basis for a supposed socialist transition.

In contrast, Lenin’s analysis of imperialism suggested that only revolutionary class struggle could realise peace, and this process would have an international context rather than national dimensions. Hence, what was apparent was that different theories of reality were justifying either a national-based political practice, or alternatively internationalism.

Thus, what connects the example of the dispute between Kautsky and Lenin, and the contemporary degeneration of the SWP is the importance of the relation between theory and practice, or the difference between what are reformist and revolutionary programmatic standpoints. In contemporary terms, the opportunist degeneration of the SWP is not because they reject the theory of imperialism. On the contrary, they adhere to it very dogmatically, and argue that capitalism is still primarily nation-based.

This is how the contradictions of world capitalism are perceived, but the very rigidity of this standpoint has led to the justification of a reformist practice. For they cannot imagine the international class struggle outside of the national state terrain, which is reduced to a tactic of putting pressure on the existing state.

Paradoxically this approach also explains the attempt to maintain a formal revolutionary ideology based upon the importance of inter-imperialist contradictions producing economic and political instability that will generate social change (see Chris Harman, ‘Snapshots of capitalism today and tomorrow’ International Socialism Journal No113). But this formal and increasingly antiquated theory does not generate a revolutionary practice, and instead increasingly justifies a national and opportunist-based practice of putting pressure on the nation-state, which is linked to a strategy of the modification of capital-labour relations rather than adherence to the aim of the transformation of these social relations.

In other words, the SWP use their very loyalty to a form of Marxist orthodoxy, or a dogmatic advocacy of the theory of Marx and Lenin, in order to justify a reformist type of political practice. The very formalism of the theory, including justification of a type of economic catastrophism, pseudo-optimism about the prospects of the class struggle and allegiance to a timeless theory of imperialism, actually upholds a reformist practice.

Theory dynamically interacts with practice, which is why the struggle against the opportunism of the SWP has a crucial theoretical aspect. Thus, if we cannot develop a more convincing conception of the global world economy, modern imperialism and the relation between the state and the international character of the productive forces, then we are disarmed in the struggle to oppose the reformist practice of the SWP.

But Peter adopts a different approach. The main problem with the SWP is its lack of democratic centralism: “The SWP leadership, for instance, cannot allow open, honest and public criticism, because that would inevitably expose its dismal departure from working class principle.” Hence, Peter conflates the organisational form with the theoretical and political content. The question of an absence of programme, and the connected opportunism, certainly has an organisational form, but what is its content? The content is provided by the very theoretical limitations which sustain the reformist degeneration of the SWP.

So, whilst an open democratic centralism may be considered welcome and necessary, this will not in and of itself resolve the political problems of the SWP. Instead what is primarily called for is a theoretical and programmatic transformation that will facilitate the development of a theory to sustain and uphold a revolutionary type of practice. Such a process will not automatically and mechanically follow the installation of a more fluid democratic centralism. To believe that democratic centralism is all that is required is an expression of an organisational fetishism that downplays the importance of a conscious struggle to oppose theoretical limitations and develop an alternative approach.

Indeed, the standpoint of Peter is the basis of conciliation of the SWP. For, if we minimise theoretical differences, and at the same time elevate the importance of democratic centralism, or the primacy of the role of the party regime, the political impetus will be created for conciliation with the new leadership that results from the operation of a more open type of party democracy.

It is entirely possible that the realisation of a more democratic leadership can coexist with the continuation of the very theoretical problems that have generated the opportunism of the SWP. Indeed, previous oppositional tendencies within the SWP have called for an end to bureaucratic centralism, whilst proclaiming their allegiance to the orthodoxy of SWP theory. In other words, support for opportunism in theory, which is then combined with the illusory call for a new and more principled practice.

However, the only and most effective way in which a different type of practice can be sustained is by a theoretical revolution that would be consistent with it. The only alternative to this standpoint is to say that questions of theory are essentially of an abstract quality and therefore do not affect the implementation of a different type of practice that would be brought about by the realisation of a more open democratic centralism.

What has actually resulted is that the ‘new’ and open democratic centralism sustains an opportunist practice, a situation which will only nourish continual rebellions against the party leadership. The result will be either the implementation of new forms of bureaucratic centralism in order to maintain the hegemony of the existing leadership, as happened in the early 1970s SWP, or else the beginning of a protracted process of a theoretical transformation that will truly and effectively transcend the opportunist limitations of the SWP. Only then will party democracy as an organisational form become consistent with the relation between theory and practice.

At this point, Peter may well object and argue that the question of party democracy goes alongside the possibility to develop opposition to opportunism, which is represented by support for halfway housism, and all other forms of unprincipled politics. In other words, in an inconsistent manner, Peter, and by implication Mike Macnair, recognise the link between theory and practice. How do we start the process of opposing opportunism other than by developing the struggle at the level of theory, which will then acquire implications at the level of practice?

Peter essentially agrees with this point, but his difference with me is actually at the theoretical level, because he seems to suggest that the question of the SWP’s attitude towards globalisation does not have practical implications and so is irrelevant, whilst the attitude of the SWP about republicanism, secularism, open borders and other questions is of immediate practical importance, and therefore requires an immediate political response. In other words, Peter would theoretically disagree with me that the SWP’s opportunism on these concrete issues can be connected to its stance on globalisation, imperialism and the role of the nation-state.

Consequently, our theoretical differences have important practical implications, in that we have a different strategy of how we relate to the SWP, and how we could evaluate its effective transformation. For Peter, what is involved is the rejection by the SWP of its effective reformist programme, together with the adoption of democratic centralism. To me, this is not sufficient, because we have not yet explained the basis of this opportunism, which is represented by the SWP’s understanding of contemporary social reality. As long as the SWP adheres to a particular conception of reality, the impetus will still be present for opportunist politics. Thus, it is not the adoption of the Respect project that explain such opportunism: rather Respect represents the organisational form that upholds a particularly limited and flawed conception of reality.

From his one-sided emphasis on the role of the SWP, Peter suggests that Marxist unity may be promoted by the SWP. He does accept that such a possibility is unlikely, but we would have to regard such a possibility in a flexible and open manner. He adds: “We would certainly regard the new grouping as a site for struggle, where we could continue to conduct the ongoing campaign for a Marxist party.” What is not explained by his hypothetical example is how the SWP would gain from this formation of a party of Marxist unity. Why the SWP, which is presently dominant on the left, would benefit from a united party. We already know its attitude to the Socialist Alliance. The SWP tossed it aside when it believed that the SA was no longer acting in its interests. Consequently, why would the SWP tolerate a party in which it was no more than one faction among many?

Peter does not answer this question, because the CPGB strategy effectively accepts that a party of the united ‘Marxist’ left requires the benevolent role of the SWP. He may qualify this by suggesting that the CPGB would not conciliate within this organisation, but this is not good enough. For the CPGB approach - that we cannot bypass the left - is ultimately dependent upon goodwill gestures from the SWP and this represents the conciliationist logic.

The CPGB glosses over the only principled basis that political unification with the SWP could occur, which is when the balance of political forces have changed between the SWP and the rest of the left. Such a possibility will only occur when the fragmented Bolshevik left has united, and the Mensheviks are becoming a minority. Only then will the conditions be created for favourable ideological and political struggle that can realise the progress of revolutionary ideas against reformist ones.

How can such a situation be brought about? The answer is by fusion of the potentially revolutionary groups, and the connected development of their increasing theoretical coherence and expansion. In contrast, Peter calls for a united party of the left, which means everything and nothing, a recipe for confusion and stalemate.

The process of unity cannot start from grand ideas that actually justify sectarianism. Peter issues an ultimatum to the left: “The central point for partisans of genuine Marxist unity is not some narrow, confessional agreement, but partyism. Are our prospective partners prepared to abandon their confessional sects (based on agreement with a particular analysis or line) and agree to unite around democratic centralism in a Marxist party of the whole class, where contending views are fought out in the open?”

In contrast to such ultimatism, the very possibility of what would presently be small-scale, yet realistic unity, around a process of give and take, is possible. For example, at the recent Permanent Revolution discussion weekend, Stuart King said that the split with Workers Power had indicated the necessity of open democratic centralism, and he made a cautious call for dialogue with the left.

If the CMP conference had passed the DSA resolution calling for discussions with Permanent Revolution, it would have been possible to put these good intentions to the test. We could have asked Permanent Revolution whether they would be prepared to argue for their ideas within the CMP. In other words, what would be their conditions for joining the CMP?

Instead of such a process of negotiation, the CPGB raises an ultimatum calling upon all other organisations to reject their apparent character as a sect. Such a call will undoubtedly make many new friends! In practice, this supposedly unity call will make little progress, and the result will be that the CPGB will remain with its unobtainable ideal of the united Marxist party of the left. A party that can only be realised via the goodwill of the SWP.

Furthermore, Peter cannot make any constructive argument as to why the CMP should not approach groups like Permanent Revolution. Instead, he effectively argues that it is a matter of indifference what Permanent Revolution - or anyone else, for that matter - is saying about globalisation. The implication is that the analysis of globalisation has little significance for our political practice.

The recent Permanent Revolution article by Bill Jefferies shows the shallowness of Peter’s indifference to questions of supposed ‘high theory’. Jefferies argues that Chris Harman, the main economist of the SWP, uses out of date figures in order to exaggerate the extent of economic crisis within the British and world economy, and therefore Harman argues that we are in a period of shallow upswing that will in the short-term give way to prolonged crisis and recession, with the implication that political upheaval and renewed class struggle will be the outcome. Hence, Harman presents a one-sided and superficial economic analysis in order to support the over-optimistic, catastrophist and one-sided political perspectives of the SWP.

Such an approach cannot sustain principled politics based on the attempt to understand reality as it is, rather than trying to impose a conception of how we would like reality to be: “What are the contradictions that will undermine the duration of the current upswing? How does it affect the work of socialists in the present? These are the key questions which Harman is unable to answer. The purpose of Marxists is not to deny objective reality, just because it doesn’t fit some theory. It is not to deny the existence of the upswing because it is different, lesser (or potentially greater) than the long boom, but to understand the world in order to change it now” (‘A distorted picture of British and global capitalism’ Permanent Revolution No5, 2007).

In other words, the SWP, despite the erudition and learning of its major theoreticians, is unable to start from the important methodological principle of how we best understand reality in terms of an appraisal of the full extent of its contradictions. Instead one-sidedness is central to their approach, because what is important is the subjective necessity to uphold increasingly outdated political perspectives. The practical result of this subjectivism is an inability to develop a strategy that can correspond to reality as it is. Instead strategy is based upon reality as we would like it to be.

However, pointing out important theoretical limitations in the standpoint of an opponent does not necessarily in and of itself mean that we have a superior approach. For we have to test our own conclusions against reality, and there is no guarantee that these will prove to be correct, because of the very problem that consciousness may lag behind developments within reality. This does not necessarily vindicate scepticism: rather we have to continually develop concepts, such as globalisation and contemporary imperialism, which can enhance our capacity to interpret the facts and provide the most all-rounded appraisal of reality that is cognitively possible.

A revolutionary approach is the most appropriate in this regard, because it understands that only when we are able to know reality as objectively as possible will it be possible to generate the theoretical conditions for change. Thus, Kautsky in 1914 minimised the importance of the contradictions of world capitalism in order to vindicate his reformist and pacifist approach, whilst Lenin tried to recognise the full extent of the economic and political crisis as the basis of a revolutionary standpoint.

Contrary to what Peter is suggesting, the result of this process is not adherence to a monolithic line. For example, disagreement with the reformist implications of the SWP’s theory of globalisation does not automatically generate an understanding of what globalisation is. Instead what will be required will be an intense process of discussion, with much disagreement, as to how we understand globalisation and what it implies for the class struggle of the international working class.

This discussion cannot be limited by adherence to a majority line. Rather a philosophical understanding of the complexity of reality indicates that only when different views flourish can the theoretical and political conditions be generated for the possibility of arriving at the most objectively developed conception of reality. In contrast, the creation of heretics that do not uphold the majority view is an expression of the suppression of a standpoint that may actually be more objective than the majority standpoint in terms of its greater appreciation of the contradictions of reality. Indeed, this is why this view is being opposed! Hence, it would represent the triumph of subjectivism and opportunism if the party was based upon an orthodox line.

However, this would not mean that the relationship between differences would be limitless. Obviously to argue a position that was identical to that of the SWP would show the degeneration of a revolutionary approach into that of reformism. But the very capacity of an organisation to oppose reformist ideas effectively would be connected to its capacity for theoretical development.

This is why the question of what constitutes a revolutionary party is not primarily about unity in action, because it is entirely possible that an agreed action can be opportunist if the appropriate theoretical foundation is absent. For example, if we do not have a coherent conception of imperialism, the possibility for opportunism is present. This explains the Alliance for Workers’ Liberty’s opportunism on this question, because they empirically disconnect the economic and political aspects of imperialism, and the so-called progressive political impulses of imperialist military intervention are accommodated to.

In other words, we develop a conception of opportunism and revolutionary politics not by a retreat into sterile orthodoxy or dogma, but instead by the very process of theoretical development which continually refines what it means to be principled. The very enemy of this process is to simply reduce questions of theory into an expression of a partisan adherence to a given line.

What is on offer is not the creation of a sect around a particular line, but instead the elaboration of theory in order to explain an increasingly complex world in principled and non-dogmatic terms.

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